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While there is an established body of research examining risk preferences, time preferences 
and smoking behaviour, there is little literature exploring the relationship between risk 
preferences, time preferences, and smoking cessation contingency management (CM) 
programmes. This dissertation evaluates a CM study and its effect on smokers’ ability to quit 
and smoking intensity, together with their risk and time preferences. The experiment comprises 
87 University of Cape Town students wanting to quit smoking, randomly assigned into 
treatment and control groups. Risk and time preferences are elicited at the beginning of the 
programme, using incentive-compatible decision-making tasks. The relationship between the 
individuals’ risk preferences, time preferences, and smoking outcomes is explored using two 
general approaches: standard statistical models and structural models. In the structural models, 
maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate time preference parameters jointly with risk 
preference parameters. Results are broadly consistent across the two approaches. With respect 
to abstinence, the statistical model suggests that the likelihood of abstinence increases with 
discount rates, while the structural models suggest CM reduces the effect that time preferences 
have on abstinence. Neither approach finds a difference in risk preferences between abstinent 
and non-abstinent participants. In terms of smoking intensity, both approaches unexpectedly 
find smoking intensity to increase with risk aversion, and neither approach finds a relationship 
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Tobacco smoking1 is harmful. To the smoker, the habit is associated with an increased 
prevalence of cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, cancer, pregnancy complications, 
fertility issues, teeth and gum issues, cataracts, type-2 diabetes, and rheumatoid arthritis. 
Smoking also increases inflammation in the body and harms the immune system’s ability to 
function. Furthermore, harmful effects are not restricted to the smoker. Second-hand smoke 
causes several health problems in infants and children, including more frequent and severe 
asthma attacks, respiratory infections, and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). Non-smokers 
who are exposed to second-hand smoke at home or at work increase their risk of developing 
heart disease by 25%-30%, and their risk for stroke and lung cancer by 20-30% (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). 
Despite its harmful effects being well-known, smoking is widespread in South Africa. Among 
the country’s adults, almost 18% are smokers (Reddy et al., 2015). Annually, approximately 
44 000 South Africans die from smoking-related diseases and complications (Western Cape 
Government, 2018). This toll on South African lives is substantial, but smoking’s harm can 
also be viewed through the lens of the heavy burden it leaves on the tax-payer funded public 
healthcare system. Treatment for smoking-related diseases is expensive and means that limited 
resources are diverted away from other patients and other primary health care programmes 
(The National Department of Health, 2018). Globally, the amount spent on treating smoking-
attributable diseases amounts to 5.7% of total health expenditure, with 40% of these costs 
occurring in developing countries (Goodchild, Nargis and D’Espaignet, 2018).   
There is good reason for governments to not only pursue policies that prevent citizens from 
starting smoking, but also those that help smokers to quit. After 15 years of quitting smoking, 
 




the risk of death among ex-smokers reverts to the same as those who have never smoked. Ten 
years after having quit smoking, the risk of cancer is reduced by 30-50% (Fagerström, 2002). 
The excess risk of coronary heart disease halves within one year of stopping smoking and the 
excess risk of stroke returns to that of non-smokers within 5 to 15 years of smoking cessation 
(Fagerström, 2002). Among other health benefits, quitting smoking also carries significant 
improvements in the ex-smoker’s gastrointestinal system, and reproductive system 
(Fagerström, 2002).  
Thus, tools that help smokers to quit are invaluable. Since 1994, South African government 
interventions have included banning advertising tobacco products, classifying nicotine as an 
addictive drug, adding warning labels to packs, restricting smoking in public places, increasing 
excise duties (sin taxes) on cigarettes, and including smoking’s harms in the school curriculum. 
These measures have undoubtedly had an impact, with aggregate cigarette consumption falling 
by 39% between 1991 and 2004 (Reddy et al., 2013). However, after the sharp decline in 
cigarette consumption over that period, reductions have steadied. Between 2010 and 2015, 
South Africans consistently consumed slightly less than 30 packs of cigarettes per capita per 
year with no noticeable decrease over that period (Filby, 2018).  
The diminishing reductions in smoking has made it important to expand the toolset used to 
curb tobacco demand. Pharmacotherapies (such as nicotine replacement therapy), exercise-
based interventions, and behavioural therapies are receiving increased focus as measures to 
increase smoking abstinence. One such behavioural therapy is contingency management (CM), 
which is characterised by rewarding individuals that achieve a particular positive behavioural 
change. In the case of smoking, it would mean people addicted to smoking are rewarded for 
abstaining from cigarettes. CM programmes rely on the principle that a behaviour reinforced 





CM programmes have been successfully used to treat a range of addictions, including smoking 
(Cahill, Hartmann-Boyce and Perera, 2015). Furthermore, Hofmeyr, Kincaid and Rusch (HKR, 
2020) show that the rewards need not be substantial, nor the treatment intensive, for the 
programmes to have any effect. Nevertheless, degrees of effectiveness vary between smoking 
cessation CM programmes and between the individuals within these programmes. Thus, it is 
important to understand what underlying factors lead people to quit smoking. These factors 
may include the smokers’ external characteristics such as social background, socio-economics 
and shifting cultural norms, or the smokers’ internal characteristics which include their risk 
and time preferences.  
Because smoking significantly increases the likelihood of developing a range of health issues, 
we would expect that the more risk averse one is, the less likely it is that they smoke. However 
experimental evidence for this relationship is mixed (Sato and Ohkusa, 2003; Anderson and 
Mellor, 2008; Goto et al, 2009; Harrison et al., 2018). Similarly, because smoking offers one 
immediate gratification that, at face-value, is outweighed by its long-term harms, we would 
expect the more one discounts their future well-being, the likelier it is that they smoke. 
Evidence largely supports this hypothesis (Barlow et al., 2017).  
This paper examines the relationship that smokers’ risk and time preferences have on their 
likelihood of quitting and their smoking intensity2 within the context of a CM programme. For 
this analysis, a CM programme is useful because it provides a sample of smokers incentivised 
to quit smoking. As some will manage to quit while others fail, this offers the opportunity to 
explore the reasons behind the participants’ different outcomes.  
The CM programme used in this paper, conducted in 2017, recruited UCT students wanting to 
quit smoking. The programme was run as a randomised controlled trial (RCT) with 87 
 




participants, and it was efficacious in promoting abstinence, but only while participants 
received rewards (HKR, 2020).    
At the baseline session, participants completed two separate and incentive-compatible 
decision-making tasks that elicited their risk and time preferences. Risk preferences were 
elicited using the Random Lottery Pair design developed by Hey and Orme (1994), while time 
preferences were elicited using a choice-based method similar to Coller and Williams (1999). 
These data are used to investigate the relationship between risk preferences, time preferences, 
and smoking behaviour using two main statistical approaches. By including variables for risk 
and time preferences, the first method builds upon HKR’s random-effects probit model for 
investigating smoking abstinence, as well their random-effects negative binomial model for 
investigating smoking intensity. The second approach, introduced by Andersen et al. (2008), 
is to jointly estimate risk and time preference models by maximum likelihood, conditioning the 
estimates on the participants’ likelihood of abstinence and smoking intensity.  
Results are broadly consistent across the two approaches. With respect to abstinence, neither 
approach finds risk preferences to be a predictor of abstinence. However, the random-effects 
probit model suggests that the likelihood of abstinence nonlinearly increases with discount 
rates, while the parameter estimates for the jointly estimated discounting models suggest CM 
reduces time preference’s significance as a predictor of abstinence. In terms of smoking 
intensity, both approaches unexpectedly finds that smoking intensity tends to increase with risk 
aversion, and neither approach finds a relationship between smoking intensity and time 
preferences. 
Section 2 provides a literature review of economic theories of addiction, CM programmes, risk 




discusses the experiment’s design and methods, and Section 4 outlines the statistical 
methodology. Section 5 presents results and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
A. Theories of Addiction 
This section introduces economic models of addiction. I examine the Rational Addiction Model 
(RAM) of Becker and Murphy (BM, 1998) and the contribution of Orphanides and Zervos 
(OZ, 1995). Dual system and dual self models are then discussed, models, which unlike RAM, 
account for time-inconsistent behaviour and the associated pattern of quit attempts and relapse 
that is a hallmark of addiction. 
BM developed a model of rational addiction that incorporates some salient features of 
addiction, including tolerance, reinforcement, and withdrawal.  The model posits that agents 
choose to consume an addictive good after calculating the benefits and costs, while accounting 
for the interdependency between past, present, and future consumption when maximizing 
utility over their lifespan. BM introduces the idea of consumption capital, which is a 
depreciating accumulated stock of the addictive good. Welfare declines as consumption capital 
rises. However, the greater one’s consumption capital of an addictive good, the greater the 
benefit from consuming more of the addictive good now. Thus, past consumption of the 
addictive good affects current utility through the accumulation of consumption capital. 
Adjacent complementarity, the pattern of past consumption reinforcing current consumption, 
is an assumption that explains why agents continue to consume addictive goods despite the 
decline in their welfare (Hofmeyr, 2015).  
RAM is a deterministic, as opposed to stochastic, model, and thus does not include subjective 




preferences because agents discount exponentially any future costs and benefits. The stronger 
an agent’s rate of preference for the present, the more weight they would attribute to present 
consumption relative to the costs it has on their future welfare. Thus, an agent with a high 
discount rate favours the immediate benefit of consuming the addictive good at the expense of 
long-term welfare (Hofmeyr, 2015).  
OZ made significant contributions to RAM. Their theory is based on three fundamentals. First, 
consumption of the addictive good is not equally harmful to all. Second, individuals have 
subjective beliefs regarding this harm. Third, beliefs are optimally updated (via Bayesian 
updating) with information gained through consumption. The model assumes that consumers 
do not have perfect foresight, but that agents are rational in the sense that they form plans to 
maximise expected utility through time. For example, decidedly casual smokers risk the 
possibility of addiction because they believe their personal propensity for addiction is below 
the addiction threshold given their consumption capital. Thus, the benefits of smoking a casual 
cigarette makes it worthwhile. But because the casual smoker may later find that their past 
assessment of the potential harm and possibility of addiction is inaccurate, they may come to 
regret their past decisions to smoke.  
OZ’s model also provides insight into quitting. Once consumers come to realize their true 
addictive tendency, potential addicts rapidly change their consumption pattern. If they are 
above the critical level of consumption capital, they go on a binge. If they are below the critical 
level, they quit by going ‘cold turkey’.  
The model also provides important insights into the way these subjective beliefs, which 
manifests in the model’s stochastic nature, interact with risk preferences to influence addiction. 
The agents’ uncertainty concerning harmful consequences and their own addictiveness type 




Models of rational addiction are widely used by economists to deal with a range of topics such 
as tobacco (Labeaga, 1999; Baltagi and Griffin, 2001), alcohol (Waters and Sloan, 1995) and 
even coffee consumption (Olekalns and Bardsley, 1996). However, Ross (2010) points out that 
in reality people do not, as the models imply, either quit immediately or keep consuming the 
addictive good until they have exhausted their budgets. Akerlof (1991) criticises the tenuous 
assumption that addicts knowingly become addicted after a series of choices made to consume 
the addictive good. Rogeberg (2004) criticizes RAM particularly strongly, along with 
economic theory generally, for being divorced from reality. He makes the argument that 
economists anchor their trust in the truthfulness of theories such as RAM through sophisticated 
but ultimately baseless mathematical models.  
While the models are imperfect, they provide some useful insights. The BM model emphasises 
that the consumption of addictive goods is affected by the extent to which the agents discount 
future utility. The stochastic nature of the OZ model shows how risk preferences may lead to 
experimentation with addictive goods, like cigarettes, which eventually lead to a harmful and 
regretful addiction. This said, time-consistent RAM cannot account for the time-inconsistent 
behaviour typical of quit attempts and relapse. Additionally, models of rational addiction 
cannot explain the need for (often costly) commitment devices that many people use to limit 
consumption of addictive goods (Hofmeyr, 2015). The subsequent dual self and dual system 
models provide a solution to these shortcomings. 
Dual system models are typically synchronic in that there are competing subpersonal agents 
vying for control of behaviour at each point in time. By contrast, dual self models are framed 
such that the agent is not a construction of competing subagents at each point in time, but a 
succession of competing selves over time. Moreover, dual self models typically emphasise the 
importance of time preferences while dual system models highlight the role that risk 




Dual system models, developed by Bernheim and Rangel (2004) and Benhabib and Bisin  
(2005), incorporate the idea of two subagents competing for control of the agent’s behaviour 
at each point in time. The one subagent makes decisions that are reflective and controlled while 
the other subagent makes decisions that are automatic and myopic. The model incorporates 
time-inconsistent choice behaviour through stochastic temptations. These temptations 
potentially steer the agent towards immediate gratification by overwhelming the rational 
decision-making process.   
The agent’s initial decisions to use the addictive good are decided by the ‘cold’ and controlled 
self but as use increases the agent becomes more suggestive to environmental cues that trigger 
the impulsive, myopic, ‘hot mode’ decision-making self. Over time, continued impulsive 
consumption leads to addiction. Susceptibility to be triggered into ‘hot mode’ thinking also 
explains relapse after trying to quit an addiction. When a hot mode is triggered, the agent 
always consumes the addictive good regardless of their underlying preferences (Hofmeyr, 
2015).  
Gruber and Koszegi's (2001) dual self model incorporates present-biased decision makers who 
make choices that are always aligned with their preferences at the time of making the choice 
but may not align with their long-term interests. Present bias refers to people’s tendency to 
more strongly weight payoffs that are closer to the present time when considering trade-offs 
between two future moments (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Thus, for the sake of immediate 
gratification, the agent may systematically make choices contrary to their true long-run 
preferences. Like the dual system model, this approach also allows for time-inconsistent choice 
behaviour but through quasi-hyperbolic discounting. For example, you may decide to eat 
pudding this week and delay the start of a diet until next week, but once next week comes 




and relapse. The present self may decide to quit the addictive good only for their efforts to be 
undone by a future self tempted by the immediate benefit that the addictive good offers.  
The model has been criticized by Bernheim and Rangel (2004) for two shortcomings. Firstly, 
the agent consumes all pleasurable goods excessively, not just addictive goods. Secondly, the 
present bias is not triggered by any environmental cue. All the agent’s choices are affected by 
present bias. 
RAM (with OZ’s contributions), along with the dual self and dual system models provide 
important insights into explaining addictive behaviour. Of particular relevance to this 
dissertation is the role of risk and time preferences in explaining addiction.  The OZ model 
shows how an individual’s risk preferences may lead to experimentation with, and ultimately 
an addiction to, an addictive good. With the dual system models, risk preferences drive 
inconsistent choice behaviour through the stochastic realization of environmental cues that 
trigger the consumption of an addictive good. RAM incorporates time preferences with 
consumers exponentially discounting future costs and benefits. The dual system and dual self 
models also incorporate time preferences, but with non-exponential discounting, which allows 
for the time-inconsistent choice behaviour that characterizes addiction.  
B. Contingency Management 
Literature involving smoking contingency management (CM) interventions is now discussed. 
Based upon Petry's (2000) review, I discuss CM best practices, particularly in the context of 
smoking. The discussion then draws from the extensive review conducted by Cahill, Hartmann-
Boyce & Perera (CHP, 2015). In the review, I discuss the respective interventions’ settings, the 
participants, detail the interventions’ incentive structure(s), measurement techniques and 




CM intervention design 
A contingency management (CM) intervention is a type of behavioural therapy where treated 
subjects are rewarded for positive behavioural change. Originating from the token economy 
approaches of 40 years ago, CM procedures have been used to treat a variety of addictions, 
including nicotine (Kazdin, 1982). The behavioural principles are centred about three basic 
tenets. The first is that the CM intervention is set up so that the target behaviours (e.g., smoking 
abstinence) are easily detected. This would entail the frequent monitoring of breath carbon 
monoxide (CO) levels or urinalysis testing. Secondly, those enrolled in the programme are 
provided tangible reinforcers whenever they demonstrate the targeted behaviour. These 
rewards may include an amount of money for testing negative for tobacco smoking. Thirdly, 
when subjects fail to exhibit the targeted behaviour, these rewards are withheld (Petry, 2000). 
The reinforcers (or incentives) used should depend on how available and practical they are for 
the specific CM intervention.  Halpern et al. (2015) discuss the effectiveness of voucher versus 
cash rewards. Voucher-based reinforcement therapy (VBRT), popularized by Higgins et al. 
(1991), allows individuals to choose between desirable goods and services for testing abstinent. 
Because cash is not provided, vouchers reduce the likelihood of the reward being used to 
purchase drugs. VBRT is disadvantageous in that it can be difficult to employ and manage. 
The rewards can become expensive and there is the logistical burden of purchasing and 
transporting the specific requested items (Petry, 2000; Prendergast et al., 2006).  
Cash avoids the logistical issues associated with vouchers. Additionally, because cash is 
usually preferred to a voucher of equivalent value (Amass et al., 1996), changes in the targeted 
behaviour may be brought about at lower cost. The concern that cash will be used to buy and 
use the drugs that the programme is targeting is alleviated when the subjects are tested 
regularly. Furthermore, there is evidence that cash rewards do not lead to higher rates of drug 




programmes that use cash reinforcers face the difficult task of raising enough funds for the 
rewards (Petry, 2000). 
Another incentive system is one where participants deposit some of their own money into an 
(often) interest-bearing account and only receive the principle (with interest) if they 
successfully complete the programme. This method has the advantage of not requiring the 
intervention’s implementors to raise funds for rewards but it is more difficult to enrol 
participants (CHP, 2015). 
Once the desired behaviours and rewards have been chosen, the next stage is to design the 
monitoring and reward schedule. Substance addiction is a preferred target because usage is 
testable biochemically through breath, urine, or blood tests. When designing CM interventions 
that reinforce drug abstinence, the goal is to detect whenever subjects use the targeted drug. 
CM interventions thus usually test subjects 2-3 times a week as this is regular enough for most 
urine testing systems to detect any instance of use of the targeted drug. CO testing, the method 
used in this dissertation, needs to be done more regularly for the programme managers to be 
confident that participants have not been smoking. This is because a smoker’s CO levels will 
be the same as a non-smoker’s by 24 to 48 hours after their last cigarette. This allows a still-
smoking participant to ‘game’ the intervention by not smoking two days before the CO test and 
then smoking again afterwards. But while CO testing as regularly as every day would alleviate 
this concern, logistical and budgetary constraints may make this standard impractical to uphold 
(Petry, 2000; Stitzer and Petry, 2006).  
The CO threshold used to measure abstinence varies widely. Maximum thresholds range from 
4 parts per million (ppm) (Secades-Villa et al., 2014; Dallery, Raiff and Grabinski, 2015), to 




(Glasgow et al., 1993), 10ppm (Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Gallagher et al., 2007) 
and as high as 11ppm (Rand et al., 1989).  
An alternative biochemical test to breath CO, and one not used in this study, is to test urine or 
blood cotinine levels. Cotinine is a chemical compound that is formed in the body after nicotine 
is consumed. The advantage over the breath CO test is that cotinine has a half-life nine times 
that of CO, which means that it can detect if a participant smoked a lot further back than CO 
testing (Schepis et al., 2008). While this advantage is significant, this dissertation only tests 
breath CO as additionally testing cotinine would have been too expensive and subjects may 
have been uncomfortable with the somewhat invasive testing method, possibly leading to 
attrition.  
In CM studies, subjects that provide a negative test result receive the reinforcer. To best 
reinforce desired behaviour, rewards should be provided immediately, a standard that can be 
difficult to keep if test samples need to be sent to external laboratories or hospitals for screening 
(Petry, 2000; Prendergast et al., 2006). The magnitude of the reinforcer is another important 
consideration. The larger the reinforcer, the likelier the CM intervention is to change behaviour. 
Stitzer and Bigelow (1984) found that smoking abstinence increased as a function of the 
magnitude of the reinforcer. In addition, Meredith et al. (2014) argue that the magnitude should 
be adjusted depending on the severity of the addiction and the difficulty in bringing about the 
target behaviour.  
Another common feature of CM programmes is to increase the reward the longer the period of 
abstinence. For example, the first negative test result earns a voucher equivalent to R100, the 
second negative result R120, and so on. The reward typically resets to its original level after a 
subject submits a positive test result (i.e., relapses). Roll, Higgins and Badger (1996) compared 




intervention, finding that the escalating schedule resulted in longer periods of continuous 
abstinence than constant rewards (Petry, 2000; Meredith et al., 2014).  
In contrast to the escalating schedule is the front-loaded or tapering schedule; the incentive is 
largest in the beginning of the programme and reduces over time. Feelings of withdrawal are 
strongest at the beginning of a quit attempt. Thus subjects may need a higher reward as a 
substitute for the addictive good initially, but the reward can be decreased the longer the subject 
maintains abstinence (Meredith et al, 2014). 
Another aspect of CM programmes is whether to include additional behaviour reinforcement 
like group therapy, counselling, maintenance therapy (for example nicotine patches) or other 
kinds of support. Higgins et al. (2019) find that interventions that combine reinforcers and 
therapy produce better outcomes than CM on its own.  
Review of smoking cessation CM interventions 
CHP (2015) review 21 smoking cessation CM intervention RCTs. Of the studies, 16 were based 
in the USA, 3 studies were based in the UK (Paxton, 1980, 1981, 1983), 1 in the Philippines 
(Giné, Karlan and Zinman, 2010), 1 in Spain (Secades-Villa et al., 2014), and 1 in Thailand 
(White, Dow and Rungruanghiranya, 2013). Ten of the studies were set in clinics or health 
centres (Paxton, 1980, 1981, 1983; Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Shoptaw et al., 
2002; Volpp et al., 2006; Gallagher et al., 2007; Alessi and Petry, 2014; Drummond et al., 
2014; Secades-Villa et al., 2014), one in villages served by community health workers (White, 
Dow and Rungruanghiranya, 2013), two in an academic institution (Tevyaw, Colby, Tidey, 
Kahler, et al., 2009; Ledgerwood et al., 2014), one in an urban community (Giné, Karlan and 
Zinman, 2010), and the rest in worksites. Worksites are a common CM intervention setting due 
to the structure of the American healthcare system which obliges employers to cover the 




covers healthcare costs, there is less incentive for employers to involve themselves with their 
employees’ health.  
The studies cover 8413 individuals, with sample sizes ranging from 45 (Alessi and Petry, 2014) 
to 2538 (Halpern et al., 2015). Importantly, most of the participants are employees from 
American companies that are predominantly white with relatively high levels of education and 
income. This may undermine the generalisability of the studies’ results to other populations 
with different socio-economic, ethnic, and cultural mixes.  
A variety of incentives were used in these studies. Three studies used lottery or raffle tickets 
as the incentive rewarding verified abstinence (Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Alessi 
and Petry, 2014; Ledgerwood et al., 2014). Nine studies used cash payments as the incentive 
(Windsor and Lowe, 1988; Rand et al., 1989; Jason et al., 1995; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp 
et al., 2006; Gallagher et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009; Drummond et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 
2015). Two studies (Glasgow et al., 1993; Hennrikus et al., 2002) combined cash payments 
with a grand-prize lottery draw with quitters eligible for entry. Six studies (Paxton, 1980, 1981, 
1983; Giné, Karlan and Zinman, 2010; White, Dow and Rungruanghiranya, 2013; Halpern et 
al., 2015) used the system where participants deposit their own money at the beginning and are 
refunded after successful abstinence over the course of the programme.3 In one VBRT study 
(Secades-Villa et al., 2014), subjects accumulated points for each successful abstinence test 
which could later be used as vouchers for goods and services. The magnitude of the rewards 
across studies ranged from $100 (Volpp et al., 2006) to $800 (Halpern et al., 2015). 
The frequency at which subjects received rewards varied significantly. Some studies delivered 
incentives daily (Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Jason et al., 1995; Tevyaw et al., 
2009; Alessi and Petry, 2014; Ledgerwood et al., 2014) whereas Giné, Karlan and Zinman 
 
3As part of their study, Halpern et al (2015) assessed the outcomes of cash reward versus participants being paid 




(2010) only provided an incentive at the end of the programme. Two different incentive 
schedules were used: a constant incentive schedule (Rand et al., 1989; Glasgow et al., 1993; 
Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Jason et al., 1995; Hennrikus et al., 2002, Halpern et 
al., 2015), and an escalating incentive schedule (Shoptaw et al., 2002; Tevyaw et al., 2009; 
Drummond et al., 2014; Secades-Villa et al., 2014). 
Only one study, Glasgow et al. (1993), did not provide participants any kind of additional 
support over and above the CM incentives. The other studies used a range of additional forms 
of encouragement to quit smoking. These included giving the participants brochures containing 
information on quitting tips and the dangers of smoking (Paxton, 1980, 1981, 1983; Windsor 
and Lowe, 1988; Rand et al., 1989; Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Jason et al., 1995; 
Giné, Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Halpern et al., 2015), to nicotine replacement therapy 
(Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Volpp et al., 2006; Gallagher et 
al., 2007),  and individual or group  counselling (Hennrikus et al., 2002; Tevyaw et al., 2009; 
Alessi and Petry, 2014; Secades-Villa et al., 2014). Thirteen of the studies used multi-
component support programmes, and some combination, therefore, of the smoking cessation 
programmes described above. 
All the included studies used some form of biochemical verification. All but one, Rand et al. 
(1989), tested cotinine at baseline to confirm smoking status, and later to validate the subjects’ 
claims of abstinence. Rand et al. (1989) only made use of CO testing while ten of the other 
trials used CO testing to supplement cotinine testing (Glasgow et al., 1993; Crowley, 
Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Jason et al., 1995; Shoptaw et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2007; 
Tevyaw et al., 2009; Alessi and Petry, 2014; Drummond et al., 2014; Ledgerwood et al., 2014; 




All studies followed up with participants for at least six months from the beginning of the 
intervention. The period over which subjects could be rewarded for abstinence ranged from 
three weeks (Tevyaw et al., 2009), to one month (Paxton, 1980; Hennrikus et al., 2002; Alessi 
and Petry, 2014; Ledgerwood et al., 2014), six weeks (Secades-Villa et al., 2014), two months 
(Paxton, 1981; Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995), seventy-five days (Volpp et al., 2006), 
three months (Shoptaw et al., 2002; White, Dow and Rungruanghiranya, 2013), four months 
(Paxton, 1983), six months (Windsor and Lowe, 1988; Rand et al., 1989; Jason et al., 1995; 
Gallagher et al., 2007; Giné, Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Drummond et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 
2015), and one year (Glasgow et al., 1993; Kim et al., 2009).  
I now consider to what extent the studies may have been biased. Potential sources of bias are 
important considerations when assessing the outcomes of interventions. Selection bias 
describes the bias that results from the treatment and control groups systematically differing in 
some important way. This bias can be mitigated if participants are randomly assigned to the 
control and treatment groups (Kendall, 2003). Every study except Paxton (1980, 1981, 1983) 
at least claim to have used a randomisation procedure. Of the studies using randomisation, 
seven conducted sequence generation and allocation concealment (Windsor and Lowe, 1988; 
Volpp et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2009; White, Dow and Rungruanghiranya, 2013; Drummond et 
al., 2014; Ledgerwood et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 2015), while four were found not to have 
implemented adequate allocation concealment (Shoptaw et al., 2002; Gallagher et al., 2007; 
Alessi and Petry, 2014; Secades-Villa et al., 2014). For the rest of the studies, they claimed to 
have used randomisation but details concerning how they were employed were not provided.      
Performance bias occurs when the behaviour of those in the treatment group (or control group) 
is influenced by virtue of being in the treatment group (or control group). One way in which to 
alleviate this bias is through blinding, a protocol where participants’ do not have their group 




emphasised among the studies, with only four (Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Jason 
et al., 1995; Volpp et al., 2006; Tevyaw et al., 2009) making any attempt to do so. While 
blinding would reduce concerns of performance bias, rewards for abstinence typically reveal 
to participants which group they are in, rendering blinding futile.  
Attrition bias is when there is a systematic difference between the treatment and control groups 
in terms of the number of participants leaving the experiment (Kendall, 2003). In terms of 
attrition bias, fifteen of the studies (Windsor and Lowe, 1988; Rand et al., 1989; Glasgow et 
al., 1993; Crowley, Macdonald and Walter, 1995; Jason et al., 1995; Volpp et al., 2006; 
Gallagher et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009; Giné, Karlan and Zinman, 2010; White, Dow and 
Rungruanghiranya, 2013; Alessi and Petry, 2014; Secades-Villa et al., 2014; Drummond et al., 
2014; Ledgerwood et al., 2014; Halpern et al., 2015) treated programme drop-outs and losses 
to follow-up as not abstinent. Of all the studies, only one (Rand et al., 1989) is deemed to be at 
high risk of attrition bias, with significantly more in the treatment group lost than in the control 
group.  
Halpern et al. (2015) and Volpp et al. (2006) show promising results for the efficacy of CM 
interventions. At their last post-payment follow-ups,4 sustained quit rates were significantly 
higher among the treatment group(s) compared to their control groups. Notably, among all 
studies, Halpern et al. (2015) offered subjects the highest rewards for testing abstinent as well 
as the largest sample sizes of over 400 subjects. The study on which this dissertation is based 
offered participants a far more modest reward. The other studies reviewed by CHP show that 
CM interventions often have a significant effect during the period when subjects earn rewards 
for abstinence, but thereafter differences between treatment and control groups are not 
 
4 Halpern et al. (2015) had their last follow-up session twelve months after the final reward payment. Volpp et 




clinically significant.5 Overall, the studies suggest that CM is an effective long-term cessation 
strategy only if the programme’s rewards are substantial. 
The CM studies discussed above show that there is a wide degree of variation in their setting, 
method, and outcomes. The studies look to see if CM programmes lead to higher long-term 
quit rates among smokers. The studies do not seek to explain the underlying reasons why within 
a study some subjects successfully abstain, and others fail. The following sections introduce 
ways in which to incorporate risk and time preferences, two characteristics unique to 
individuals that may offer an explanation.    
C. Risk preferences 
This section explores methods of eliciting individuals’ risk preferences and provides a brief 
review of different estimation procedures. The elicited preferences are used to estimate the 
curvature of a utility function and sometimes, a probability weighting function. This section 
draws substantially on Harrison and Rutström (2008). 
The first method to elicit risk preferences is the multiple price list (MPL) design. The earliest 
MPL design in the context of risk attitudes is Miller, Meyer and Lanzetta (1969) though instead 
of subjects being presented with alternatives on a single list, alternatives were presented 
individually over 100 trials. Other versions were developed, with that of Holt and Laury (HL, 
2002) becoming the standard framework of many subsequent experimental designs. 
 
 
5 CHP, in their analysis of all 21 studies, report that cessation rates at the six-month follow-up are significantly 
greater among the treated, with an adjusted odds ratio (OR) of 1.72 (95% confidence interval 1.43 to 2.08). The 





Table 1: Holt and Laury (2002) MPL 
Row Lottery A Lottery B Expected payoff 
difference (A – B) 
1 1/10 of $2.00,   9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85,   9/10 of $0.10 $1.17 
2 2/10 of $2.00,   8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85,   8/10 of $0.10 $0.83 
3 3/10 of $2.00,   7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85,   7/10 of $0.10 $0.50 
4 4/10 of $2.00,   6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85,   6/10 of $0.10 $0.16 
5 5/10 of $2.00,   5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85,   5/10 of $0.10 -$0.18 
6 6/10 of $2.00,   4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85,   4/10 of $0.10 -$0.51 
7 7/10 of $2.00,   3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85,   3/10 of $0.10 -$0.85 
8 8/10 of $2.00,   2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85,   2/10 of $0.10 -$1.18 
9 9/10 of $2.00,   1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85,   1/10 of $0.10 -$1.52 
10 10/10 of $2.00,   0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85,  0/10 of $0.10 -$1.85 
 
HL’s MPL table is presented Table 1. Descending the rows, subjects choose lottery A (“safe” 
lottery) or lottery B (“risky” lottery). The last row can be regarded as a test of whether the 
subject understood the instructions because lottery B clearly dominates lottery A. The lottery 
of interest is the one where the subject makes a “switch” from lottery A to lottery B. We would 
expect a risk neutral subject to switch from lottery A to lottery B where the expected payoff 
difference becomes negative, which first occurs on row 5 of Table 1. A risk averse subject 
would make the switch after the payoff difference becomes negative, and a risk seeking subject 
would make the switch before. Typically, only one row is randomly selected to be played out, 





By putting some parametric structure on a subjects’ utility function, we can use the subjects’ 
pattern of choices to define upper and lower bounds on the risk preference parameter r of the 
power utility function: 
U(y) =yr                                                                 (1)                                                                 
where y is the outcome of the lottery, and the above function displays constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA). As an example, assume a subject satisfies expected utility theory (EU) and 
chooses lottery A until row 6 and lottery B thereafter. The upper bound can be solved for using 
the following equation: 
0.6($2)r + 0.4($1.6)r = 0.6($3.85)r + 0.4($0.10)r ≈ 0.6 
To calculate the lower bound:  
0.7($2)r + 0.3($1.6)r = 0.7($3.85)r + 0.3($0.10)r ≈ 0.3 
This implies that the subject has a risk preference parameter r lying in the open interval (0.3, 
0.6) if they choose lottery A until row 6 and lottery B thereafter. These elicited bounds may 
be appropriately analysed using interval regression.6  
MPLs have the advantage of being simple: subjects usually understand the logic, allowing them 
to respond in a way that accurately reflects their risk preferences. Another consistent feature is 
that the respondents see all choices in a single ordered table. Subjects may use the table to 
compare their current choice against their past choices, possibly leading them to make choices 
more consistent than they would be in settings without their past choices available for them to 
see. However, despite subjects being able to refer to their previous choices, subjects still often 
make inconsistent choices by selecting multiple switch points. Andersen et al. (2006) argue 
 
6 Hofmeyr (2015) criticises the approach that uses the midpoint of the interval, e.g., 0.45 in this case, arguing 




that multiple switch points may indicate indifference between the choices as MPLs typically 
do not have an option to signify indifference. 
The Random Lottery Pair (RLP) design, developed by Hey and Orme (1994), is another method 
used to elicit preferences which can then be estimated parametrically or non-parametrically. It 
is the risk preference elicitation method used for this dissertation. An RLP asks subjects to 
make binary choices over lottery pairs, in which probabilities vary for a set of monetary prizes 
of, say, R0, R100, R200 or R300 (Harrison and Rutström, 2008). An example of one lottery 
choice, from Hey and Orme (1994), is presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Lottery display used by Hey and Orme (1994) 
 
Subjects may express preference for one lottery over the other or indifference. The lotteries are 
presented on computer screens, with pie charts representing the prizes and probabilities in the 
lotteries. Typically, only one of the lottery choices is randomly picked to be played out which 
promotes incentive compatibility while lowering overall costs. The main advantage of RLP is 




risk attitudes from the pattern of responses, so some form of estimation is required (Hey and 
Orme, 1994; Harrison and Rutström, 2008).  
Titration is another method used for eliciting risk preferences. Richards et al. (RZMW, 1999) 
popularized the method in their paper that looked at the effect that addictive drugs have on 
impulsive decision-making.  
In titration, participants are given a series of choices between a small certain amount of money, 
or $10 with a probability of receipt of 1.0, 0.9, 0.75, 0.5 or 0.25. The certain amount of money 
is adjusted across successive trials until a certainty equivalent is found, where the subject is 
indifferent between the smaller but certain amount and the risky $10. Certainty equivalents are 
elicited for each of the five probabilities using a random adjusting-amount procedure (Richards 
et al., 1999). The answer to the previous question is used to narrow the range of values from 
which the next question is selected. In the first trial for one of the five probabilities, the variable 
amount is randomly selected to be anywhere between $0 and $10 in $0.50 increments. The 
variable amount in the next trial adjusts according to the response from the current trial. 
Suppose a subject was asked to choose between a certain $4 or $10 with probability 0.5, and 
the subject chooses the certain amount. The variable amount in the next trial will be an amount 
(in $0.50 increments) between $0 and $4.7 If the subject is presented with a choice of $3 for 
sure, or $10 with a probability of 0.5, and the subject chooses the latter, the certainty equivalent 
is calculated as $3.50. That is, the subject is found to be indifferent between a certain $3.50 
and a 50/50 chance of getting $10 or $0. The process of choosing between adjusting certain 
amounts and lotteries repeats across trials until the certainty equivalent is calculated for each 
probability (Richards et al., 1999). 
 
7 Had the subject preferred the $10 lottery instead, the variable amount in the following trial would be some 




Titration has at least two issues. The first is that if a subject makes a mistake, it becomes 
impossible to recover the subject’s true indifference point. That mistake will be incorporated 
into the algorithm that determines the following set of choices (Hofmeyr, 2015). The second is 
an incentive-compatibility issue. A subject that realizes that their future choices depend on their 
current choices can ‘game’ the mechanism so that they are offered higher rewards on 
subsequent decisions. Let’s suppose a subject chooses between $4 for sure, and $10 with 
probability 0.5. If the subject chooses the gamble, the subsequent decision will involve certain 
amounts higher than $4. If the next certain amount is $7 and the subject again chooses the 
gamble, the next certain amount will be an amount greater than $7. A subject with a true 
indifference point of $3.50 has thus increased their expected reward by misrepresenting their 
preferences (Hofmeyr, 2015).  
There are ways in which these issues can be overcome. The first issue can be overcome by 
using two top and two bottom limits rather than just one top limit ($10 in the previous example) 
and one bottom limit ($4 in the previous example). By using multiple top and bottom limits, as 
RMZW do, the subject’s indifference point can be elicited even after a mistake (Richards et 
al., 1999).    
When the experiment is a combination of both risk and time preference elicitation tasks, the 
adjustment algorithm can be hidden (to a degree) from subjects by mixing risk and time 
preference decisions. Distractor trials are also often presented: trials with responses that are not 
recorded and with parameters not determined by previous responses. Like mixing tasks, the 
distractor trials hopefully prevent subjects from figuring out the algorithm. However the 
drawback is that it makes the task more complex and increases the cognitive burden required 




Risk attitudes can be estimated from observed behaviour using the two main procedures 
mentioned above. The first approach is to calculate bounds based on the observed choices from 
a risk preference elicitation method, typically using utility functions which only have a single 
parameter to be inferred. The second and preferred method is to directly estimate risk attitudes 
by maximum likelihood.8 This method, used by Hey and Orme (1994), is useful for non-EU 
specifications, where several core parameters combine to determine risk attitudes.  
D. Time preferences 
People tend to prefer receiving an amount of money sooner rather than later. One of the earliest 
treatments of this behavioural trait is due to Samuelson (1937), where he proposed the 
discounted utility model. The model was rapidly accepted as both a standard for public policies 
(e.g., in cost-benefit analysis), and also as an accurate depiction of real-life behaviour 
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). However, despite its appealing 
mathematical tractability, by the 1950s the model’s assertion of time-consistent preferences led 
to alternative models such as Phelps and Pollak's (1968) quasi-hyperbolic (QH) discounting 
function and Mazur's (1987) hyperbolic discounting function. Describing each model is 
important as each proposes a unique conceptualization of the decision-making process. As I 
use all three functions in my later analysis, I will discuss each, drawing from Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014). 
However, before discussing the different discounting functions, I will explain the relationship 
between the discount factor D and the utility function U(‧). D is the scalar, for a particular time 
horizon τ, which equates the utility of income (y) received at time t with the utility of income 
received at time t + τ:  
U(yt)=DU(yt+τ)                                                          (2) 
 




If we assume U(‧) is linear in y then D is the discount factor that equalises income received at 
time t with income received at time t + τ. 
Samuelson's (1937) discounted utility model uses the exponential discount factor: 
DE(t) = 1/(1+δ)t                                                          (3) 
For t  ≥ 0 and where the discount rate d is: 
dE(t) = δ                                                                    (4) 
The model has two useful features. First, it is mathematically tractable as the geometric series 
∑t D
E(t) converges in the limit. Second, the discount rate d
E(t) is constant over time, thus 
implying time-consistent preferences. 
The exponential discounting function’s property of time-consistent preferences contrasts with 
other models, the first of which I discuss is Phelps and Pollak's (1968) QH discounting 
function: 
DQH(t) = 1 if t = 0                                              (5) 
DQH(t) = β / (1 + δ)t if t > 0                                               (6) 
The QH model accounts for present bias in discounting behaviour and time inconsistency.9 
That is, preferences over future options can change depending on the point in time at which 
these future options are evaluated. The QH model incorporates the tendency for people to 
prefer, as an example, R100 today to R105 tomorrow but prefer R105 in 31 days to R100 in 30 
days. In other words, the rate of discounting decreases as rewards are delayed further in the 
future. If β = 1 the QH specification collapses to the exponential model, whereas if β < 1 
discounting is quasi-hyperbolic.  
 
9 Present bias refers to people’s tendency to more strongly weight payoffs that are closer to the present time 




The discount rate in the QH model is the value of dQH(t) which solves DQH(t) = 1 / (1 + dQH)t. 
Thus, 
dQH(t) = [ β / (1 + δ)t](-1/t) – 1                                               (7) 
For t > 0, present bias manifests itself when β < 1 as there is a sharp drop in the value of a 
reward if it is not available immediately. The extent of this drop in the reward’s value declines 
over time as the discount rate asymptotes towards δ (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Hofmeyr, 2015).  
Loewenstein (1996) attributes present biased preferences to ‘visceral factors’ – feelings of 
hunger, thirst, sexual desire, and addiction-caused cravings. He argues that people underweight 
and ignore visceral factors that will be experienced in the future, leading to inconsistent choice 
behaviour (Loewenstein, 1996).   
The hyperbolic specification has a discount factor: 
DH(t) = 1 / (1 + δt)                                                       (8) 
Unlike the previous two discounting specifications, the harmonic series does not converge 
making the hyperbolic function not as popular in the economics literature. However, because 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting received wider usage only after Laibson (1997), much of the 
available literature, particularly in psychology, has made use of the hyperbolic function. The 
discount rate for this model is: 
DH(t) = (1 + δt)1/t – 1                                                     (9) 
The discount rate declines over time and thus allows time-inconsistent preferences under the 
assumption of an additively-separable intertemporal utility function (Mazur, 1987).  
The dominant methods for eliciting time preferences are similar to the elicitation methods for 
risk preferences. The methods can be divided into two main types: choice-based and titration, 




Choice-based methods present participants with a series of choices between a larger, later (LL) 
and a smaller, sooner (SS) reward. The presented choices often offer real rewards but can also 
be hypothetical. Real rewards provide a more reliable revelation of the participant’s preferences 
as hypothetical rewards are not incentive compatible, but some studies have argued that 
hypothetical rewards are a dependable proxy (Madden et al., 2003). Typically, at the end of the 
experiment one of the subject’s choices is randomly selected for payment. 
The choices between SS and LL rewards can be organized from lowest to highest implied 
discount rates or the order of presentation can be random. The more choices presented to 
subjects, the more accurate the elicited discount rate can be, in principle. Another important 
consideration in the development of a time preference task is the inclusion of a front-end delay 
(FED) to the SS reward. Prior to Coller and Williams (1999), the SS reward was always 
immediate. However, at least some of the subjects’ preference for SS rewards may be due to 
transaction costs and uncertainty associated with the receipt of the LL reward. When the SS 
reward is not immediate, i.e., a positive FED, these issues are negated. Thus, an FED holds 
these costs constant across the two rewards (Hofmeyr, 2015).  
The titration procedure builds upon the choice-based method and works in much the same way 
as the procedure to elicit risk preferences. An algorithm is used so that when a subject makes 
a choice between SS and LL, that choice then determines the subsequent SS and LL choices 
the subject faces. Titration narrows down the subject’s indifference point for a particular delay 
period (Hofmeyr, 2015).  
As an example, if a subject chooses $10 after 7 days over $5 now, the algorithm assumes that 
$10 after 7 days will be chosen over all amounts less than $5 available now. Thus, the search 
interval for the subject’s indifference point will be narrowed to between $5 and $10. The 




the subject chooses $7.50 now, the next question’s SS reward will be narrowed to between $5 
and $7.50. If the subject instead chose the $10, the next question will offer an SS reward 
between $7.50 and $10. This algorithm continues until it converges upon an open interval 
containing the subject’s indifference point (Hofmeyr, 2015).  
The indifference points can then be fitted to a discounting function (Hofmeyr, 2015). However, 
taking the average value between the two SS rewards from the titration procedure arbitrarily 
discards information regarding the uncertainty of the estimate. All that one can infer from the 
pattern of choices is that an indifference point lies in the open interval, for example ($7.50, $8). 
Taking the average of these values, e.g., $7.75, should not be used for making statistical 
inferences. 
Similar to the procedure used to elicit risk preferences, the nature of the algorithm means that 
titration cannot find a subject’s true indifference point if the subject makes a mistake. The other 
issue mentioned earlier is that the subject can ‘game’ the system to earn higher rewards 
(Hofmeyr, 2015).  
There are a few statistical methods in which time preference data may be analysed, with 
maximum likelihood estimation and the area under the curve (AUC) method being the two 
most prominent in literature relating time preferences to CM interventions. As it is the method 
used in this dissertation, I will provide a detailed discussion of maximum likelihood estimation 
in the statistical methodology section.  
The AUC method, introduced by Myerson, Green and Warusawitharana (2001), differs to the 
maximum likelihood method in that it does not assume that discounting follows a particular 
theoretical framework, such as the exponential discounting function. Consequently, the method 




consensus regarding the mathematical form of the discounting function. The method also 
avoids the statistical problems created by skewed distributions. 
Figure 2: Calculation of the area under the empirical discounting function (Myerson, Green 
and Warusawitharana, 2001) 
 
Figure 2 represents the AUC with a plot, where the y-axis represents the ‘normalized subjective 
value’ for each data point and the x-axis represents the ‘normalized delay.’ The plot shows the 
delay discounting data for a single subject, with the data being point estimates of the 
indifference values taken from a delay discounting task. The subjective value is normalized by 
dividing the subjective value by the actual delayed amount. The delay is normalized by 
expressing the delay as a proportion of the maximum delay. A curve can then be constructed 
by plotting the subjective values against the respective delays. Vertical lines are drawn from 
each data point on the x-axis, subdividing the graph into a series of trapezoids. The sum of the 
areas of these trapezoids gives the area under the empirical discounting function. The steeper 
the discounting, the smaller will be the area under the curve. Because the x and y values are 
normalized, the area under the curve can vary between 0.0 (steepest possible discounting) to 




While AUC does have the advantage of being theoretically neutral, its use of point estimates 
is a major drawback. We can compare the AUCs of the two groups, but we cannot use valid 
statistical methods to test hypotheses that the AUCs of the two groups are different (Harrison 
et al., 2018). Maximum likelihood estimation, which will be discussed in the section addressing 
statistical methodology, avoids this use of point estimates when drawing inferences.  
E. Risk preferences, time preferences, and smoking cessation 
Of the 21 smoking CM studies reviewed in CHP, none investigated the effect of subjects’ risk 
and time preferences on the programme’s success. In this section I review CM studies that 
address subjects’ risk and time preferences. Of particular importance are Krishnan-Sarin et al. 
(2007), Dallery, Raiff and Grabinski (2015), González-Roz et al. (2019), and Weidberg et al. 
(2015), as they look at smoking CM interventions whereas Stanger et al. (2012) and Washio, 
et al. (2011) look at other substance addictions. The discussed studies were searched for in 
Google Scholar, EBSCOhost and PubMed using the search terms ‘contingency management’, 
‘time preferences’, ‘risk preferences’, ‘delay discounting’, ‘probability discounting’, 
‘smoking’, and ‘tobacco.’ Surprisingly, no papers were found that sought to investigate the link 
between CM programmes and risk preferences.   
Stanger et al. (2012) conducted a CM study among adolescent marijuana abusers or dependent 
users and tested whether delay discounting is a predictor of treatment outcome. All participants 
received one of three 14-week treatments. The first was cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) 
only, the second was CBT and CM, and the third was CBT, CM and a Family Management 
Curriculum.10 The CM programme used an escalating reward schedule with a reset contingency 
if subjects tested positive for marijuana use. Participants in the CM programme could earn a 
 
10 The Family Management Curriculum is received during weekly counselling sessions and covers identifying 
and labelling adolescent behaviour, developing incentives and consequences for change, limit-setting, 




maximum of $590 over the 14-week period. Substance use was validated biochemically twice 
a week using urine tests. There was no post-treatment follow-up to check the long-term 
effectiveness of the CM programme (Stanger et al., 2012).  
Stanger et al. (2012) used a titration method for their delay discounting task with delay periods 
of 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, and 6 months. They did not elicit risk preferences. The rewards 
were hypothetical amounts of money or amounts of marijuana. A hyperbolic discounting 
function was used to estimate the discount rate. The method in which the elicited data was 
fitted was not mentioned but presumably they employed nonlinear least squares.  
The study found lower delay discounting to predict both a higher number of negative drug tests 
and a longer period of continuous abstinence. The discount rates elicited from the high money 
amount ($1000) were a better predictor of marijuana abstinence than the discount rates elicited 
from the low money amount ($100). Interestingly, the discount rates elicited from delay 
discounting tasks involving marijuana did not predict marijuana abstinence (Stanger et al, 
2012).  
Looking at cocaine dependent subjects, Washio et al. (2011) implemented a study examining 
whether delay discounting is associated with the duration of cocaine abstinence. The 
participants consisted of 36 adults equally divided into ‘low CM reward’ and ‘high CM reward’ 
groups. Treatment occurred over a period of 24 weeks.  
The CM programme used VBRT, but the magnitudes of the rewards in the ‘low CM reward’ 
and the ‘high CM reward’ treatments nor the reward schedule, were mentioned in the paper. In 
addition to the CM programme, subjects also received additional information regarding the 
Community Reinforcement Approach.11 Participants were only rewarded for testing negative 
 
11 The Community Reinforcement Approach is a comprehensive behavioural treatment package that focuses on 





for cocaine use. Urine specimens were collected from all study participants according to a 
thrice-weekly schedule, with specimens screened immediately on-site.  
The delay discounting task used a titration method, asking subjects to choose between an 
immediate SS and a LL ($1000) reward that could be received 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 
months, 1 year, 5 years, or 25 years in the future. The amounts were hypothetical and the 
procedure did not utilize a FED. A non-linear regression was used to fit each participant’s 
indifference points to the hyperbolic model.  
Regression analyses showed delay discounting to be statistically significantly related to the 
duration of continuous cocaine abstinence, with higher discounting predicting a lower 
likelihood of abstinence. Additionally, participants receiving the higher magnitude vouchers 
on average achieved an additional 6.3 weeks longer abstinence than those receiving the lower 
magnitude vouchers. Importantly, participants were not followed up after the treatment period. 
As mentioned above, while there is substantial literature concerning smoking CM 
interventions, there is little delving into its relationship with participants’ risk and time 
preferences. Dallery, Raiff and Grabinski (2015) carried out an internet-based smoking CM 
study. The primary objective was to evaluate the efficacy of internet-based CM to promote 
smoking cessation. A secondary objective was to assess predictors of outcomes during 
treatment based on demographics, smoking characteristics, and individual differences in time 
preferences.  
The participants were 77 smokers between the ages of 18 and 60 who had smoked for at least 
2 years and smoked at least 10 cigarettes per day. The participants also had to express a desire 
to quit smoking. Applicants were excluded if they were addicted to any other substance or 
 
substitute a lifestyle involving the use of addictive goods with activities related to a pleasurable and healthy 




reported a history of psychiatric or medical illness that could interfere with the study. 
Participants were screened in-person. The study took place over a period of 24 weeks with no 
follow-ups after treatment.   
The CM programme made use of VBRT, with participants earning a maximum of $530.00 in 
voucher earnings. The rewards escalated with successive negative CO readings. The study used 
a two-group RCT with the difference between the two groups being whether the vouchers were 
delivered contingently or noncontingently, based on smoking abstinence. The main treatment 
phase occurred over 21 days with CO test submissions made twice daily. Those in the 
noncontingent group were matched with someone in the contingent group and only received a 
voucher when the person that they were matched with received a voucher. To earn vouchers, 
noncontingent participants still had to submit CO readings. For participants from both groups, 
the subjects recorded their own CO readings on video which were then submitted to an online 
application. From these recordings the participants would earn rewards, with readings less than 
4ppm considered negative. After the main treatment phase, test submissions and voucher 
delivery were decreased to twice a week.  
The delay discounting task used a titration method and hypothetical money amounts with an 
adjusting SS amount and $100 LL amount that could be ‘received’ after 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 
month, 4 months, 8 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years, presented in random order. To 
measure the extent of delay discounting Dallery, Raiff and Grabinski (2015) adopted the AUC 
approach. It is not apparent whether a FED was used.  
The study’s results suggest that internet-based CM can promote abstinence. The median 
percentages of negative samples in the control and treatment groups were 25% and 67% 
respectively.12 Interestingly, over the course of the programme the noncontingent group saw its 
 




average CO levels decline despite not being rewarded for abstinence. The study found higher 
discount rates to be marginally associated with a lower likelihood of abstinence, suggesting 
attempts to tailor CM programmes to the subjects’ discount rates may not work. However given 
the paper’s lack of emphasis on delay discounting’s relationship to quitting smoking, reasons 
for this weak relationship were not explored (Dallery, Raiff and Grabinski, 2015).  
Krishnan-Sarin et al. (2007) examined the relationship between impulsivity and smoking 
cessation treatment response among adolescents. The study involved 30 subjects between 14-
18 years old, smoking at least 10 cigarettes a day, and wanting to quit smoking. Participants 
with diagnosed major depressive disorder were excluded from the study. The intervention was 
conducted in a school. 
The CM programme took place over 4 weeks. Participants were divided into two groups: the 
treatment group received CBT and CM while the control group received CBT alone. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either group. CO levels were measured twice a day in 
the first two weeks, once a day in the third week, and once every other day in the fourth week. 
Participants in the treatment group were subject to an escalating reinforcement schedule with 
a reset contingency, with $1 for the first CO level that was below 8ppm and increments of 25 
cents for each successive negative test result. Moreover, subjects received a non-escalating $5 
for providing a negative result on a urine cotinine test, presumably to incentivize participants 
to take the more invasive but more reliable test.  Participants in the treatment group could earn 
up to $313.75 over the 1-month programme (Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2006; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 
2007).  
Time preferences were measured before the participants’ quit date. Measurements were made 
using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (Patton, Stanford and Barratt, 1995), a choice-based 




task” that used small amounts of real money and short time delays (Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 
2005). The Conners’ Continuous Performance Test-II was also used to measure the subjects’ 
level of impulsivity (Conners, 2000). For the choice-based delay discounting task and 
experiential discounting task, the data were analysed by calculating the AUC directly from the 
indifference point values.  
In terms of the experiential discounting task, non-abstinent participants discounted more 
heavily than abstinent subjects, on average. No significant differences were observed on other 
discounting/impulsivity measures (Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007).  
González-Roz et al. (2019) looked to identify clusters of treatment-seeking smokers, and to see 
if these clusters responded differently to CM treatment. Two clusters were identified, the first 
being characterized by participants with excessive tobacco demand and the second with steep 
delay discounting. The study used the combined data from two previous smoking cessation 
trials, one an 8-week programme and the other a 6-week programme (Secades-Villa et al., 
2014; González-Roz el al., 2019). Accordingly, the number of participants was relatively high, 
comprising 305 treatment-seeking smokers. For inclusion, participants had to be aged 18 or 
over, smoke at least 10 cigarettes per day, and meet the diagnosis of nicotine dependence.  
Individuals who reported mental health issues and/or abuse of a substance other than nicotine 
were excluded.  
Both CM programmes had a control group that received CBT and a treatment group that 
received CBT and CM. The CM reward schedule was escalating, with participants potentially 
earning up to $307 or $342 depending on the cessation trial. Along with self-reports, abstinence 
was confirmed biochemically with CO readings ≤ 4ppm and cotinine levels ≤ 80ng/mL.  At 




evidence that would suggest CBT and CM is a more effective strategy at bringing about 
smoking cessation than CBT alone.  
Time preferences were elicited 1 week before treatment began.13 Participants were tasked to 
make a series of choices between hypothetical SS amounts of money (but subject to a FED), 
and hypothetical LL amounts of money available 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 5 years, 
or 25 years after the SS reward is available. The choices that were presented to participants 
were determined by a titration procedure. The discount rates were measured by an AUC method 
and separate binary regression analyses were performed for assessing the treatment response 
(i.e. abstinent vs. smoker) at the posttreatment and 6-month follow-up, broken down by 
treatment condition.  
González-Roz et al. (2019) found there to be similar short-term and long-term cessation rates 
between the control and treatment groups, regardless of cluster membership. However, 
smokers in the “steep discounting” cluster were likelier to quit smoking than smokers in the 
“excessive tobacco valuation” cluster 
Weidberg et al. (2015) took a different approach to assessing the relationship between CM and 
time preferences, instead looking at whether over time CM influences subjects’ level of delay 
discounting.  Their study comprised 123 adults, smoking at least 10 cigarettes a day, and 
looking for treatment to quit smoking. The participants were randomly assigned into a CBT 
only control group and a CBT + CM treatment group. The intervention period was 6 weeks, 
with a follow-up 6 months after the intervention period. Participants were tested for cotinine 
once weekly. Participants that tested abstinent were rewarded according to an escalating VBRT 
 
13 The participants’ levels of cigarette demand were elicited using a cigarette purchase task. For details, see 




schedule with a reset contingency. The maximum amount that participants could earn was 
€300.  
The delay discounting task was presented to participants at intake, end-of-treatment, and at the 
6-month follow-up. A titration procedure was used with delays of 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 6 
months, 1 year, 5 years, and 25 years. The fixed amount was €1000 with the rewards being 
hypothetical. The elicited data was analysed using both AUC and by using a non-linear 
regression model to estimate a hyperbolic discounting equation.  
Weidberg et al. (2015) found there to be no significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups’ change in delay discounting over the six-week and six-month periods. They 
also found that treatment led to higher rates of abstinence than those in the control group. The 
study did not explore whether an individual’s discount rate affects the likelihood of CM being 
a successful smoking cessation strategy.  
These studies generally suggest that there is a relationship between participants’ time 
preferences and CM intervention success. This dissertation’s approach will differ in a few 
significant respects. First, I will incorporate risk preferences in the estimation of time 
preferences by using the joint estimation technique of Andersen et al. (2008). Second, the 
sample size is larger than most of the aforementioned studies (87 subjects). Third, the rewards 
offered in the risk and time preference tasks were real rather than hypothetical, adding to the 
robustness of this dissertation’s findings. Interestingly, none of the literature discussed in this 
section used real rewards. This may be because, as discussed earlier, in the context of risk and 
time preference tasks, hypothetical rewards have been argued to be reliable proxies for real 
rewards. However, hypothetical rewards cannot be incentive compatible. Fourth, the 
participants are followed up over a longer period (6 months), which provides a better indicator 




FED. Sixth, this study examines the effect of risk and time preferences on smoking intensity 
too, an aspect the other studies have neglected. 
 
3. Design and Methods 
In this section, I discuss the CM smoking cessation programme, and the risk and time 
preference elicitation tasks that were conducted during the CM programme’s baseline 
session. Figure 3 provides an overview of the study.  
Figure 3: Study overview 
 
 
A. Recruitment and Screening 
Recruitment commenced once ethics approval14 was granted to conduct the study and 
permission to access students had been secured.  Participants were recruited via an email sent 
to UCT’s central email list. The email provided an outline of the intended research and provided 
information to prospective subjects about the expected time burden and potential earnings from 
taking part. Prospective subjects were screened with a questionnaire that collected their 
 




demographic information, smoking patterns, and whether they were interested in quitting 
smoking.15   
Of the 700 students that responded to the questionnaire, 294 were deemed eligible for the next 
stage of screening based on their self-reported information. Inclusion criteria were: participants 
had to express an interest in quitting smoking; had to be at least 18 years old and a UCT student; 
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime; smoked in the 10 hours prior to recruitment; 
smoked at least five cigarettes a day; and had a CO reading of at least 8 ppm. Figure 4 shows 
the participant induction and attrition over each stage of the experiment.  
Figure 4: Flow chart showing the number of participants through each stage of the study 
 
 





These eligible students were invited to sign up for an in-person screening session via an 
announcement sent through the university’s virtual learning environment (VLE). The 
announcement also explained that the screening session would take about 15-minutes,16 and 
students would earn a R50 show-up fee. Of the 294 students that were contacted, 169 signed 
up for and attended a screening session. Students were reminded of their session via an email 
and two SMS-reminders. 
In the screening session, after the prospective participants gave written informed consent, one 
of two research assistants (RAs)17 verbally went through and recorded the participants’ 
responses to the same questionnaire completed prior to the in-person screening session. A CO 
reading was also taken to determine the students’ smoking status. Of the 169 students who 
attended the screening sessions, 119 were eligible for the baseline session. These students were 
invited to sign up for the baseline session via the VLE. Of the 119 eligible students, 105 signed 
up for the baseline session.  
B. Randomisation 
Randomisation into the treatment (n = 52) or control group (n=53) was done using stratified 
random assignment (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013: 153–158). The stratification variables 
were gender, race, and CO reading.  
C. Baseline 
The baseline sessions consisted of two components: the collection of baseline data on the 
subjects’ smoking characteristics, and the elicitation of the subjects’ risk and time preferences. 
The seven sessions were run between 14-18 August 2017 in a computer lab at UCT. To ensure 
 
16 Screening sessions were scheduled between 09:00-12:00 and 13:00-17:00 so that students could attend 
without lecture clashes. The same approach was adopted for the programme and follow-up sessions.  




consistency, a single researcher with the help of three research assistants (RAs) conducted the 
sessions.  
The baseline sessions lasted two hours on average, making it the longest of all the sessions. 
Subjects were reminded of the session with an email and two SMSs. The component collecting 
the subjects’ baseline smoking characteristics was first done in groups and then individually. 
The component eliciting risk and time preferences was done in groups. The average group size 
was 13 subjects.  
Upon arrival to the lab, subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals separated by 
partitions. Subjects were instructed to not communicate with each other, and they provided 
written informed consent. Thereafter the researcher delivered a detailed explanation of what 
the study would entail with subjects then signing up for the programme sessions through the 
university’s VLE.  
Following sign-up, participants completed the risk and time preferences tasks. Subjects were 
given both written and audio-visual instructions for the tasks. Once a subject had finished these 
instructions and familiarised themselves with the screen-based decision-making environment, 
the subject raised their hand to receive permission to complete the task. Subjects were permitted 
to ask questions at any time. The order of the tasks alternated between sessions such that 
subjects either performed the risk or time preference task first. Subjects finished the first task 
at their own pace, and once completed, went through the written and audio-visual instructions 
before completing the second task. They then completed the second task before responding to 
a questionnaire collecting information on their demographic characteristics and smoking 
behaviour.  
After completing the risk preference task, a subject rolled two 10-sided dice to randomly select 




selected lottery. After completing the time preference task, a subject rolled a 4-sided die and a 
10-sided die to randomly select one of the choices that was made. The show-up fee and the 
earnings from the risk preference task were paid immediately in cash, and earnings from the 
time preference task were paid out on the date corresponding to the subject’s choices on the 
randomly selected question. The risk preference task, on average, took subjects 20 minutes to 
complete and yielded R226 in earnings. Correspondingly, the time preference task, on average, 
took subjects 10 minutes to complete and yielded R331 in earnings.  
Risk preference task 
The risk preference task followed Hey and Orme (1994), with an example of the interface 
displayed in Figure 5:  
Figure 5: Risk preference task interface 
 
Subjects were presented with a choice between two lotteries displayed on a computer screen. 




and Sugden (1998), Cox and Sadiraj (2008), and Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout 
(2015). For each lottery pair, the corresponding amounts and probabilities were shown. 
Subjects made 90 lottery pair choices and then a dice was used to randomly select one choice 
for payment.  
The lottery pairs captured the full range of risk preferences (i.e., risk averse, risk neutral, and 
risk loving), provided good coverage of the probability space18, and facilitated the estimation 
of non-EU models of choice under risk. The lotteries subjects faced were drawn randomly, 
without replacement, from the battery of lottery pairs, and presented to subjects sequentially. 
The prizes varied in magnitude between R0 - R700, with the probabilities varying between 0 
and 1 in increments of 0.05.  
Time preference task 
Time preferences were elicited by asking subjects to choose between a series of SS and LL 
rewards. As shown in Figure 6, 4 choices were presented on a screen at a time. Once the subject 
had made their choices on a screen, another set of 4 choices were presented on the next screen. 
The SS reward was fixed on each screen but varied across screens. A calendar was also 
displayed as a visual aid for subjects, showing when they would be receiving the amount they 
chose.  
 




Figure 6: Time preference task interface 
 
Subjects faced two FEDs to the SS rewards: a zero-day FED and a 7-day FED. The 7-day FED 
allows us to control for subjective transaction costs across the SS and LL rewards. This 
transaction cost arises because experimenters cannot give subjects the same level of certainty 
they will receive their payment at a later date as they can on the day of the experiment. 
Moreover, the FED facilitates the estimation of the parameters of a QH function because the 
zero-day FED captures present bias (β) in decision making, whereas the 7-day FED allows for 
the identification of the long-term discounting parameter (δ).  
Each subject made 60 choices in the task that were randomly drawn, without replacement, from 
a battery of 224 possible choice pairs. The possible choice pairs were constructed using a 
combination of two SS rewards (R250 and R400), four time horizons (7, 14, 42, and 84 days), 
nominal annual interest rates between 5% and 250%, and the two FEDs. At the end of the task, 
the subject rolled dice to randomly select one of these choices for payment.  
Questionnaire on smokers’ baseline characteristics and smoking habits 
After completion of the time preference and risk preference tasks, subjects completed a 




psychological well-being,19 and measures of gambling behaviour and alcohol use.20 Addressing 
tobacco use, the questionnaire included the Fagerström Test for Cigarette Dependence (FTCD, 
Fagerström et al., 2012), the Smoking Abstinence Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (SASEQ, Spek 
et al., 2013), the Minnesota Tobacco Withdrawal Scale-Revised (MTWS-R, Etter and Hughes, 
2006), and the Reasons for Quitting Questionnaire (Curry, Wagner and Grothaus, 1990). 
Additional smoking-related questions included questions focused on past quit attempts 
(Ontario Tobacco Research Unit, 2015), motivation to quit (National Centre for Smoking 
Cessation and Training, 2017), attitudes towards UCT’s new smoking policy, and 
environmental factors that may affect a quit attempt (Ontario Tobacco Research Unit, 2015). 
After completion of the questionnaire, subjects then entered the baseline session’s individual 
component. Subjects were taken to a private room in the computer lab where, along with a 
printed handout, RAs presented subjects with a summary of the cessation programme. RAs 
also gave subjects an aid-to-quit document21 and took their CO reading. Subjects in the 
treatment group were then informed that they had been randomly assigned to receive abstinent-
contingent rewards.22 Following the baseline session, subjects had one week to quit smoking.  
Subjects were only informed of their group status at the end of the baseline session so as to 
avoid selection bias. There is still the potential for performance bias as the explicit nature of 
the reward mechanism makes blinding subjects to treatment allocation impossible. To mitigate 
this issue, only subjects allocated to the treatment group were informed of their group status, 
 
19The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford and Barratt, 1995), The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et 
al., 1988), and The Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer and Brown, 1996) were administered 
20 The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (Babor et al., 2001), and the Problem Gambling Severity Index 
(Ferris and Wynne, 2001) were used 
21 The aid-to-quit document was HelpGuide.org's (2017) online guide for quitting smoking.  




not those in the control group. This design reduces the possibility of a John Henry effect23, and 
a resentment and demoralisation effect.  
D. Programme Sessions 
The programme sessions ran from 28 August 2017 to 22 September 2017 at UCT. In these 
sessions the subjects’ quit attempts were monitored, and treatment subjects were given 
abstinence-contingent incentives. The sessions started 1 week after the quit date set in the 
baseline session with subjects attending 4 sessions, once each week. Subjects were reminded 
of their sessions by an email and two SMSs. The sessions were conducted by RAs and took 
about 15 minutes to complete. All subjects earned a R50 show-up fee while those in the 
treatment group received an additional R150 contingent on smoking abstinence over the 
previous week.  
Abstinence was determined through two methods: timeline follow-back (TLFB) questionnaires 
and CO readings. The SASEQ, the MTWS-R, and the FTCD were also used at each session to 
collect data on smoking behaviour.24 An RA administered a TLFB questionnaire with subjects 
to capture their self-reported cigarette use over the 7 days prior to each programme session. 
Participants were given a printed calendar (Figure 7) which was used to track the amount they 
had smoked, beginning with the day before the session. For each day, a RA asked the subject 
if they were abstinent, and if not, how much they had smoked on that day. Subjects were 
instructed to give their best estimates of the amounts they had smoked on each day.  
 
23 The John Henry effect refers to an experimental bias that is introduced when members of the control group 
are made aware of their group status. Members in the control group may compare their performance to those in 
the treatment group and put in additional effort (in this case to quit smoking) to overcome their perceived 
disadvantage of being in the control group (Saretsky, 1972).  
24 The final session’s questionnaire included several additional questions. The questionnaire asked the subjects 
to list the names of other participants that they knew in the study, provide reasons for why their quit attempt 




Figure 7: Timeline Follow-back Calendar 
 
Subjects were recorded as abstinent, and thus eligible for the R150 positive reinforcement 
reward, if they reported being abstinent on the 7-day TLFB questionnaire and if they had a CO 
reading of 6 ppm or less. As discussed in the literature review, CO tests only reliably detect 
smoking within the previous 24 hours. Thus, rather than being used to detect whether subjects 
had smoked between sessions, CO tests were used to deter deception in the TLFB questionnaire 
as well as to tell whether the subject had smoked in the previous 24 hours. To minimise 
attrition, all subjects were paid a R200 show-up fee at the final programme session if they had 
attended all four programme sessions.25  
 
25 To ensure that the attendance reward remained salient, participants were reminded of this reward at each 
programme session.  
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E. Follow-up sessions 
After the programme sessions, 3-month and 6-month follow-up sessions were conducted. The 
purpose was to determine abstinence rates after a 3-month and 6-month period. Subjects in the 
treatment and control groups were invited to the sessions via the VLE. The announcement 
asked subjects to sign-up for a 15-minute one-on-one session with an RA and reminded the 
subjects of the R200 show-up fee.26 Subjects were reminded of their sessions by an email and 
two SMSs.  
In the session, the RA ran through a questionnaire with the subject, took the subject’s CO 
reading, and lastly paid the subject’s show-up fee.27 The questionnaire employed TLFB to 
determine smoking behaviour in the 7-days prior to the session, as well as the SASEQ, the 
MTWS-R, and FTCD were also administered. At the 3-month and 6-month follow-up, subjects 
were also asked if they had smoked since the last programme session, and if they had, the 
average number of cigarettes they smoked per day.  
F. Payment and earnings 
To ensure that the programme was administered correctly, a script was developed for the RAs 
to read when giving subjects their earnings in each of the programme sessions. The script was 
designed to encourage subjects to quit smoking and attend programme sessions.28 The scripts 
that were read to subjects varied depending on whether the subject was abstinent in the current 
programme session, whether they had attended previous programme sessions, and whether they 
had been abstinent in previous programme sessions.  
 
26 The show-up fee was larger than in previous sessions to minimise the risk of attrition after a prolonged period 
of not participating in the programme.  
27 At the 3-month follow-up, the RA also reminded the subject of the 6-month follow-up and its R200 show-up 
fee. Subjects were also made aware that the show-up fee would be paid irrespective of smoking status.  
28 The script was developed using the principles outlined in the Contingency Management Competence Scale for 
Reinforcing Abstinence (Petry et al., 2010) and the Contingency Management Competence Scale for 




In terms of earnings, subjects received a R50 show-up fee in the screening, baseline, and four 
programme sessions. Subjects earned a R200 show-up fee in each of the two follow-up 
sessions. The combined earnings for the risk and time preference tasks was R557, on average.  
In the programme sessions, treatment subjects who were abstinent earned an additional R150 
over and above the R50 show-up fee.  
 
4. Statistical Methodology 
A. Overview 
The aim of this dissertation is to link smoking cessation and smoking intensity, under a CM 
programme, to participant’s risk and time preferences. To this end, the dissertation’s statistical 
methodology adopts two approaches. The first is an extension of the probit models used in 
HKR (2020), where they implemented a random-effects probit model to see if the CM 
programme increases smoking cessation rates, as well as a random-effects negative binomial 
regression to investigate the CM programme’s effect on smoking intensity. This paper expands 
upon HKR (2020) by adding explanatory variables that capture risk and time preferences to the 
two regression models. 
The second approach is to estimate risk and time preference models by maximum likelihood, 
conditioning the parameter estimates on the participants’ treatment status and smoking 
intensity. With this method, I adopt the approach of first estimating the risk preference 
parameters and then using this estimate to provide the shape of the utility function when 
estimating the time preference parameters.  
B. Random-effects probit model 
A random-effects probit (REP) model is used to test whether a smoker’s probability of quitting 




(2020), along with a treatment dummy variable, this REP model includes regressors controlling 
for demographics and smoking characteristics. However, this dissertation extends the previous 
REP model by including regressors capturing risk and time preferences.   
A REP model is appropriate because it accounts for the panel structure of the dataset and 
therefore the correlation in standard errors over time. A random-effects model is preferable to 
a fixed-effects model because the subjects’ risk and time preferences are time-invariant, 
implying that they would drop out of a FE model. A REP model is also appropriate because 
the dependent variable, Abstinentit, is a binary response variable. The model’s specification is:  
       Pr(Abstinentit = 1 | xit) = Φ(β1Treatmenti  + β2x2i + β3x3i) + ε           (10) 
where Pr, Φ, and ε, denote probability, the standard cumulative normal distribution function, 
and the error term, respectively. Treatmenti, and the vectors x2 and x3, are explanatory variables 
that explain the dependent variable’s variation. Their coefficients, β1, β2 and β3 are used when 
calculating the marginal effect each explanatory variable has on the probability of abstinence. 
Treatmenti is a binary response variable equal to 1 if subject i is in the treatment group and 0 
if she is in the control group.  
Vector x2 contains independent variables capturing the subjects’ demographic characteristics: 
Agei and Agei
2 are continuous variables;29 Malei is a binary variable equal to one if the subject 
is male; Racei is a categorical variable that includes African (the base category), Coloured, 
Indian, and White; Income(ln)i is a continuous variable that is the natural logarithm of the 
subject’s total income in the previous month. 
Vector x3 contains variables related to risk and time preferences. Number of risky choicesi is a 
discrete variable that is a count of the number of times the subject chose the riskier option from 
 




each lottery pair in the risk preference task. Similarly, Number of LL choicesi is a discrete 
variable that is a count of the number of times the subject chose the LL reward in the time 
preference task. Also included are the quadratic terms Number of risky choices squaredi and 
Number of LL choices squaredi as the number of risky choices and LL choices made in the 
tasks have a nonlinear relationship with subjects’ risk and time preferences, respectively.  
C. Random-effects negative binomial model 
A random-effects negative binomial (RENB) model is used to examine smoking intensity 
among the participants who failed to remain abstinent. The model is ideal for this analysis as 
the model accounts for the data’s panel structure, and the dependent variable, Smoking 
intensityit, is a count variable. The RENB model used is specified as: 
Pr(Yit = yit | Xit, δi) = [г(λit + yit) / г(λit) г(λit+ δi)]‧[1 / (1+ δi)]λit ‧[δi / (1+ δi)] yit ,   (11)                                                                              
where г is the gamma distribution that loosens the Poisson regression’s assumption that the 
variance is equal to the estimated mean. Variable yit is the count dependent variable Smoking 
intensityit, which indicates the average weekly number of cigarettes smoked by subject i at 
session t.30 Parameter λit  is the gamma noise variable which gives the model its Poisson-gamma 
mixture (negative binomial) distribution and is equal to exp(xitβ). Parameter δi is the dispersion 
parameter that varies randomly across subjects. Except for the addition of the categorical 
variable Sessioni, vector Xit contains the same independent variables used in the REP model.
31 
This is a categorical variable that includes the baseline session (the base category), the 
intervention period, and the two follow-up sessions. 
This RENB model is the second stage of a hurdle model, with the first stage being the earlier 
discussed REP model. Equation (10) determines whether participant i smoked cigarettes or not 
 
30 Smoking intensityit differs from Smoking intensityi in that it is time variant. The latter variable was a measure 
taken at the baseline session, whereas the former was measured at each programme and follow-up session. 




(y = 0 versus y > 0) over the past 7 days, while equation (11) determines the number of 
cigarettes smoked over that period conditional on the participant having failed to remain 
abstinent. A hurdle model is appropriate because it accounts for the participants’ initial decision 
to smoke or abstain (equation (10)), and then the decision of how much to smoke (equation 
(11)). Importantly, a hurdle model also accounts for the possibility that the first decision and 
second decision are affected by the regressors in different ways. For example, we may expect 
low-income participants to be less likely to remain abstinent than higher income participants, 
but also expect low-income non-abstinent participants to smoke less cigarettes than their 
higher-income counterparts.  
D. Maximum likelihood estimation 
I will draw from Harrison et al. (2018) in this discussion of maximum likelihood estimation. 
In describing the strategy’s logic, I will focus on the EU and exponential discounting models, 
though it can be extended to the other models mentioned earlier quite easily. This approach has 
the benefit of using all the collected data to estimate the risk and time preference parameters, 
as well as the uncertainty of these estimates.  
Risk preferences 
We first look at estimating, r, the parameter that determines the shape of the utility function. 
We assume that the utility of income is defined by a power utility function which displays 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):  
    U(y) = yr,      (12) 
where y is the lottery prize awarded in the risk preference task. Under EU, if r > 1, the 
representative agent is risk-seeking with a convex utility function. Similarly, if r = 1, the agent 
is risk neutral with a linear utility function, and if r < 1, the agent is risk averse with a concave 




Under EU, the expected utility of a lottery is the probability-weighted utility of each outcome 
in each lottery. As per our risk preference experiment, we assume the representative agent faces 
a lottery i with three possible outcomes, each of which have their own probability of 
occurrence: 
        EUi = ∑j=1,2,3[p(yj) × U(yj)]    (13) 
To calculate r, the EU of each lottery in a lottery pair is calculated using a candidate value of r 
(for instance, r = 1), and we create a latent index that is the difference in EU between the left 
(L) and right (R) lottery:  
▽EU = [(EUR – EUL) / λ] / μ                       (14) 
where λ is a normalising term and μ is the Fechner error term. This latent index (14) 
incorporates Wilcox’s (2011) “contextual utility” behavioural error specification, permitting 
the possibility of subjects making simple mistakes such as selecting lottery L when wanting to 
select lottery R. The latent index is linked to the participants’ elicited choices using the 
cumulative normal distribution function Φ(▽EU). This function takes any value between ±∞ 
and smoothly transforms it to a number between 0 and 1, yielding the “probit” link function32: 
   Pr(Choose lottery R) = Φ(▽EU)    (15) 
This expression tells us that lottery R is chosen when Φ(▽EU) > ½, thus linking the 
participants’ observed choices to the latent index (14). If Φ(▽EU) > ½, this means that the EU 
of lottery R is greater than the EU of lottery L, and so the probability of selecting the R lottery 
is greater than 0.5. Simply put, there is a greater probability of selecting lottery R than lottery 
L if the EU of lottery R is greater than lottery L. 
 
32 Alternatively, a cumulative logistic function Λ(▽ EU) may be used, which also takes any argument of ▽ EU 




The likelihood of the observed responses, assuming the power utility and EU model are true, 
depends on the estimates of r given the probit link function and the choices subjects made in 
the risk preference task. These requirements are expressed in the conditional log-likelihood 
function: 
                   ln Li
RP(r; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(▽EU)×I(zi=1)) + (ln(1 - Φ(▽EU)) )×I(zi=0))]         (16) 
where I(‧) is the indicator function, and zi = 1(0) means that the participant chose lottery R (L) 
in choice pair i. X is a vector that captures the participants’ individual characteristics and 
behaviour that include gender, age, smoking abstinence etc. 
Extending the above to Quiggin's (1982) rank-dependent expected utility (RDU) model is 
straightforward. The model incorporates the possibility that individuals overweight and/or 
underweight the probabilities assigned to outcomes. Thus, unlike EU, it allows for nonlinear 
weighting of probabilities. When estimating a RDU model, risk preference is determined by 
two sources: the curvature of the utility function (as under EU), and the shape of the embedded 
probability weighting function (PWF). Thus, RDU’s PWF is an additional source of the risk 
premium not captured by EU. 
When using RDU, this paper incorporates the Prelec (1998) PWF for its considerable 
flexibility. Its functional form is: 
π(p)=exp[-η(-ln p)φ]     (17) 
which is defined for 1 > p > 0, and φ > 0, η > 0. Parameter φ controls the convexity/concavity 
of the Prelec function, while parameter η controls the location of the inflexion point relative to 
the 45º line.33  
 




Joint estimation of time preferences with risk preferences 
We also want to estimate δ, the discounting parameter which equalises the utility of income 
received at time t with the utility of income received at time t + τ. Assume exponential 
discounting with some utility function U(‧) and a FED on the SS reward : 
   [1 / (1 + δ)t]U(yt) = [1 / (1 + δ)
t+ τ]U(yt+τ)   (18) 
where (18) is an indifference condition that equalizes the utility of SS and LL rewards. By 
assuming EU and a power utility function as in (12), (18) can be expressed as: 
 [1 / (1 + δ)t](yt)
r = [1 / (1 + δ)t+ τ](yt+τ)
r             (19) 
The left hand side and the right hand side can be regarded as the present value (PV) of the 
utility of the SS reward and LL reward, respectively. To determine the value of δ, the PVs of 
each reward are calculated for an initial estimate of δ and the latent index below is formed: 
     ▽PV = (PVSS  − PVLL) / v                                    (20) 
which is conditional on the assumptions that EU, power utility, and exponential discounting 
hold. Similar to μ in (14), v is the Fechner error term. The latent index (20) gives us the 
difference in present values of the utility of the SS and LL rewards. This index is linked to the 
subjects’ observed choices using the cumulative normal distribution function Φ(▽PV), taking 
any argument ▽PV between ±∞ and transforming it into a number between 0 and 1.34 This 
gives the probit link function:  
    Pr(Choose SS reward) = Φ(▽PV)                  (21) 
This latent index is linked to the subjects’ elicited choices by specifying that the SS reward is 
chosen whenever Φ(▽PV) > ½. If Φ(▽PV) > ½, this means that the PV of the SS reward is 
 




greater than the PV of the LL reward, and so the probability of selecting the SS reward is 
greater than 0.5. 
Thus, the likelihood of the elicited responses, conditional on EU, the power utility function, 
and an exponential model fitting the subjects’ responses, depends on the estimates of r and δ. 
The conditional log-likelihood of the “jointly” estimated model is: 
          ln Li(r, δ; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(▽PV) × I(zi = 1)) + (ln (1 - Φ(▽PV)) × I(zi = 0))]            (22) 
where I(‧) is the indicator function, zi = 1(0) denotes the choice of the SS (LL) reward in the 
discounting task choice pair i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics which may capture 
age, gender, socioeconomic status, smoking abstinence, and other relevant variables. The 
conditional likelihood function (22) can be decomposed into its risk and time preference parts 
as: 
    ln Li(r, δ, z, X) = ln Li
RP + ln Li
TP               (23) 
Why joint estimation matters 
Andersen et al. (2008) were the first to incorporate utility function curvature in the estimation 
of discounting models, while Harrison, Lau and Rutström (HLR, 2010) were the first to use 
this joint estimation technique in the context of smoking. The idea is to use data from a task 
that elicits risks preferences to estimate the parameters that determine the curvature of the 
utility function. Elicited time preference data is then used to calculate the parameters of a 
discounting model subject to the shape of the estimated utility function.  
We can show the importance of joint estimation using the following expression:  
    U(yt) = (1 / (1 + δ)
τ) U(yt+τ)                           (24) 
While joint estimation can be done using various combinations of utility and discounting 




discounting is exponential. A subject is indifferent between income options yt and yt+τ if and 
only if the above expression holds. U(yt) is the utility of monetary outcome yt for delivery at 
time t, δ is the discount rate, and τ is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary outcome. 
The indifference condition shows that the discount rate equalizes the present value of the utility 
of the two monetary outcomes of yt and yt+τ (Harrison and Rutström, 2008). 
What is clear from (24) is that we cannot say anything about the discount rates without knowing 
or assuming something about the curvature of the utility function. If we were to assume the 
subjects had linear utility functions and instead use the formula: 
yt = (1 / (1 + δ)
τ) yt+τ                (25) 
when subjects actually have concave utility functions, the estimated discount rates would be 
biased upwards. Thus, separate tasks to elicit the curvature of the utility function should be 
implemented to estimate discount rates. Andersen et al. (2008) show that joint estimation of 
discount rates and risk preferences led to significantly lower discount rates than if they did the 
same as the previous literature and assumed linear utility functions.  
While HLR differs by examining the relationship between the likelihood of someone being a 
smoker and their risk and time preferences, their methodology is broadly like that used in this 
dissertation. HLR found that discount rates have a significant and positive relationship with 
smoking for both genders when a linear utility function is used, whereas when a concave utility 
function is used the relationship is only significant and positive among males.35 The latter 
finding that there is no statistically significant difference in the discount rates between smoking 
and non-smoking females when using joint estimation is important. The result means that the 
female smokers were significantly more risk averse (yielding more curved utility functions) 
than the female non-smokers. If the utility function was assumed linear, this would result in 
 




wrongly concluding a difference in discounting behaviour (Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2010; 
Hofmeyr, 2015). 
 
5. Baseline Summary Statistics 
Table 2 displays the summary statistics, categorised by the sample’s demographics, smoking 
characteristics, and risk and time preferences. The table also shows the sample’s split by 
treatment and control group. 
With respect to the entire sample’s demographics, the average age is approximately 22 years 
old, about 23% classify themselves as White, about 29% classify themselves as African or 
Coloured, and 19.5% as Indian. Males comprise 78% of the sample, and the average monthly 
income is R2970. The sample’s ratio of males to females is similar to the population of smokers 
in the country, with South African men four times likelier to smoke than South African women 
(Reddy et al., 2015).  
Looking at the smoking-related indicators, the sample’s average number of years smoked is 
about 3.5 years, a figure that makes sense given that the sample is primarily composed of 
students. Smoking intensity, which is the average number of cigarettes smoked per day in the 
7 days prior to the baseline session, was about 10. This variable’s standard deviation suggests 
that the sample is made up of smokers with varying smoking intensity. The FTCD score of 
about 3.5 (out of a possible 10) and MTWS score of about 17 (out of a possible 60), suggest 




Table 2: Summary statistics  
Variable Combined 
 
Treatment Control Significantly 
different?36 
Size 87 40 47  








Population group37     
  White 22.990 20.000 25.530 0.945 
  Black/African 28.740 30.000 27.660  
  Coloured 28.740 30.000 27.660  
  Indian 19.540 20.000 19.150  
Male2 0.780 0.800 0.761 0.663 







Smoking behaviour     
Smoking duration 3.376 2.769 3.891 0.077 




























Quitting smoking     
Quit attempt in past 5 
years 
0.659 0.564 0.739 0.090 







































Risk and time 
preferences 
    
Time preference task 
completed first 
0.517 0.475 0.553 0.467 
 
36 The Mann-Whitney test was used for continuous variables and a Pearson’s chi-squared test was used for 
binary and categorical variables.  





Table 2: continued 
Variable Combined 
 
Treatment Control Significantly 
different?38 
% of time preference 
choices with FED 
0.506 0.512 0.501 0.430 
% of time preference 
choices with high 
amount 
0.505 0.498 0.511 0.376 


















Note: FTCD = Fagerstrom Test for Cigarette Dependence; MTWS = Minnesota Tobacco Withdrawal Scale; SASEQ 
=Smoking Abstinent Self-efficacy Questionnaire Score; FED = front end delay 
The average SASEQ score41, Intrinsic RFQ score, and Extrinsic RFQ score42 of about 11, 5, 
and 2, respectively, suggest that at baseline participants were not confident in their ability to 
quit smoking. The average scores for Determination for current quit attempt and Importance 
of current quit attempt suggest that on average, participants were “Very determined” to quit 
and regarded their current quit attempt as “Very important.”  
Participants were equally likely to first complete the time preference task as they were to first 
complete the risk preference task. Half of the time preference choices incorporated a FED, and 
half of the time preference choices had the high SS amount (R400). The riskier lottery was 
chosen about 42% of the time and the LL reward 20% of the time, choice behaviour that is 
consistent with risk aversion and relatively high discounting. 
Mann-Whitney and chi-squared tests were used to test whether the baseline characteristics are 
balanced across the treatment and control groups. The p-values shown in the last column show 
 
38 The Mann-Whitney test was used for continuous variables and a Pearson’s chi-squared test was used for 
binary and categorical variables.  
39 Out of a maximum possible score of 90. 
40 Out of a maximum possible score of 60  
41 Out of a maximum possible score of 24 




that with the exception at the 10% confidence level for Smoking duration, Quit attempt in past 
5 years, and RFQ intrinsic score, the experimental groups are well-balanced.  
 
6. Results 
A. Statistical Models 
Smoking abstinence 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients (as opposed to marginal effects) of the REP model 
that investigates the effect that the CM programme, along with the subjects’ demographics, 
smoking characteristics, and risk and time preferences, have on smoking cessation.  
Regression 1a shows that the CM programme has a statistically significant treatment effect, 
with a marginal effect implying that the likelihood of a subject in the treatment group being 
abstinent is 12.2 percentage points higher than a subject in the control group (p=0.014). A 
statistically significant treatment effect is also found in Regression 1b and Regression 1c, with 
the significance and magnitude of the treatment effect increasing as more independent variables 
are included.   
Regression 1b includes independent variables related to the subjects’ demographic 
characteristics. Of these variables, only the population group White is statistically significant 
at the 5% level, with the marginal effects showing that White participants are on average 13.5 
percentage points more likely to be abstinent than African subjects (p=0.066), the omitted base 
category. This relationship strengthens in Regression 1c, where regressors related to the risk 





Table 3: REP models testing abstinence 
 
Regression 1a Regression 1b Regression 1c 
Treatment 1.285*** 1.366*** 1.398*** 
 
(0.314) (0.324) (0.304) 
Age  0.283 0.209 
 
 (0.267) (0.277) 
Age squared  -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Male  0.305 0.180 
 
 (0.464) (0.442) 
Coloured  0.716* 0.697 
 
 (0.428) (0.478) 
Indian  0.180 0.318 
 
 (0.533) (0.551) 
White  1.099** 1.075*** 
 
 (0.443) (0.397) 
Income (ln)    -0.223 -0.115 
 
 (0.307) (0.309) 
Number of risky choices   -0.029 
 
  (0.043) 
Number of risky choices squared   0.000 
   (0.001) 
Number of LL choices   -0.065** 
 
  (0.028) 
Number of LL choices squared   0.002*** 
   (0.000) 
Constant -2.410*** -6.144 -5.015 
 (0.297) (3.804) (4.034) 
N 609 574 574 
log-likelihood -191.192 -175.135 -171.729 
Coefficient estimates reported 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The regressors “Number of risky choices” and “Number of risky choices squared” do not 
suggest that there is a relationship between risk preferences and smoking abstinence within the 




choices squared” does suggest a relationship, as shown in Figure 8 below, with the marginal 
effects evaluated at successive 10 LL choice intervals to the maximum of 60 LL choices.  
Figure 8: Average marginal effects of LL choices 
 
The direction of the reported marginal effects is as expected, with marginal effects becoming 
positive and increasing with cumulative LL choices. Thus, Figure 8 shows a nonlinear 
relationship between the total number of LL choices and its marginal effect on the probability 
of abstinence. When evaluated at 50 LL choices and 60 LL choices, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the number of LL choices and abstinence (p=0.046 and 
p<0.001, respectively). Making 50 LL choices and 60 LL choices means, on average and 
respectively, a 2.3 and 3.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of abstinence. When 
evaluated at 0 LL choices, 10 LL choices and 40 LL choices, there is a statistically significant 





Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients (as opposed to marginal effects) of the RENB 
model, showing the relationship between a range of independent variables and smoking 
intensity when subjects are not abstinent.43  
Table 4 shows that there is no evidence that the CM programme influences smoking intensity 
in Regressions 2b-2c. In Regression 2b, variables related to demographic characteristics and 
programme sessions are added to the model. This regression’s marginal effects show that 
Coloured and White participants on average smoke about 1.5 cigarettes a day more than their 
African counterparts, the omitted base category (p=0.022 and p=0.089, respectively). The 
regression also suggests a “programme effect,” with participants on average smoking about 6.5 
cigarettes less when in the programme sessions than in the baseline session (p<0.001), the 
omitted base category. Participants also reported smoking on average about 4 cigarettes less 
during the follow-up sessions than in the baseline session (p<0.001 for Regressions 2b-2c).  
Regression 2c includes variables for risk and time preferences, and apart from the race 
variables, shares results in line with Regression 2b. In comparison to Regression 2b, only White 
participants now have a statistically significantly higher smoking intensity than African 
participants, with the estimated average marginal effect showing White participants smoking 








Table 4: RENB models testing smoking intensity 
 
Regression 2a Regression 2b Regression 2c 
Treatment 0.186* 0.074 0.167  
(0.103) (0.114) (0.110) 
Age  -0.026 -0.046  
 (0.121) (0.114) 
Age squared  0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Male  0.003 0.006  
 (0.135) (0.127) 
Coloured  0.336** 0.112  
 (0.144) (0.151) 
Indian  0.242 0.147  
 (0.169) (0.161) 
White  0.279* 0.325**  
 (0.166) (0.155) 
Income (ln)  0.033 0.030  
 (0.094) (0.091) 
Programme sessions  -1.060*** -1.012***  
 (0.062) (0.059) 
3-month follow-up session  -0.512*** -0.493***  
 (0.074) (0.072) 
6-month follow-up session  -0.505*** -0.506***  
 (0.075) (0.072) 
Number of risky choices   -0.040**  
  (0.020) 
Number of risky choices squared   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Number of LL choices   -0.004  
  (0.011) 
Number of LL choices squared   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Constant 1.242*** 2.858* 4.379*** 
 (0.138) (1.580) (1.635) 
N 455 437 437 
log-likelihood -1193.846 -1040.857 -1036.132 
Coefficient estimates reported 
Standard errors in parentheses  





The reported coefficients for the time preference variables are not statistically significant. 
“Number of risky choices” has a statistically significant coefficient, and a test of the joint 
significance of “Number of risky choices” and “Number of risky choices squared” is also 
statistically significant (p=0.008).  Figure 9, below, shows that when evaluated at 20, 30, and 
40 risky choices, the number of risky choices has a statistically significant marginal effect on 
smoking intensity (p=0.035, p=0.003, and p=0.02 respectively). As we could reasonably 
assume that the more ‘risky choices’ one makes, the less risk averse they are, this figure 
counterintuitively suggests that on average, the more risk averse a smoker is, the greater their 
smoking intensity.  
Figure 9: Average marginal effects of risky choices 
 
To assess the robustness of the REP and RENB models, a pooled probit regression and a pooled 





B. Structural Models 
Sample’s risk preferences 
Table 5 presents the estimates for EU and RDU models, using a power utility function and the 
CU error specification. Homogenous preferences are assumed, with the parameter estimates a 
reflection of the risk preference of the entire sample.  As each subject makes 60 choices in the 
risk preference task, clustering is accounted for at the individual level. 
Table 5: EU and RDU ML estimates - homogenous preferences 
 
For the EU model, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that r=1 (p<0.001), implying that, on 
average, the sample is risk averse. The model’s error term μ is also statistically significant, 
implying subjects made behavioural errors in the risk preference task (p<0.001).  
A null hypothesis that r=1 is also rejected for the RDU model. The Prelec PWF parameter φ is 
significantly less than 1 (p<0.001), implying an inverse S-shaped PWF where the subjects, on 
average, overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. The null hypothesis 
that η=1 cannot be rejected (p=0.669), thus we cannot say that participants, on average, 
overweighted low-probability outcomes relatively more or less than they underweighted high-
 EU RDU 
Power function parameter (r) 0.506*** 0.655*** 
 (0.040) (0.045) 
PWF parameter (φ)  0.592*** 
  (0.037) 
PWF parameter (η)  0.983*** 
  (0.039) 
Risk error (μ) 0.267*** 0.216*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) 
N 7830 7830 
Log-likelihood -5112.026 -4957.875 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 




probability outcomes.44 In terms of overall risk preferences, the RDU model’s power function 
parameter r and the PWF parameters both suggest a pool of participants who are, on average, 
risk averse. Further, because the PWF parameter estimates imply probability weighting, RDU 
better characterises the data than EUT. As with the EU model, the CU error parameter μ 
indicates that subjects made behavioural errors in the risk preference task (p<0.001).  
Table 6 presents the EU and RDU model estimates where parameters vary as a function of the 
subjects’ treatment status, a host of covariates related to demographic characteristics, and a 
binary variable for whether the risk preference task was completed before the time preference 
task. First looking at the EU model, participants in the treatment group are on average 
statistically significantly less risk averse than participants in the control group (p=0.01). In 
terms of the demographic covariates, the model suggests that Coloured participants are more 
risk averse than African and White participants (p=0.071 and p=0.002 respectively), and 
Indian participants are more risk averse than White participants (p=0.078). Lastly, the covariate 
for whether the risk preference task was done first suggests that participants that did the risk 
preference task first were less risk averse than participants that did it second (p=0.080).  
For the RDU model, risk preferences are inferred from the power function parameter r and the 
PWF parameters φ and η. Looking at treatment, r suggests participants in the treatment group 
have a less concave utility function than those in the control group (p=0.011), while φ and η 
do not suggest there to be differences in the way participants in the treatment and control groups 
weight probabilities (p=0.579 and p=0.479, respectively). In conjunction, these parameters 
suggest that treatment group participants are less risk averse than control group participants. 
For age, the power function parameter suggests participants’ utility function becomes less 
concave with age (p=0.057), and the parameter η suggests that the range of high probabilities 
 





that are underweighted increases with age while the range of low probabilities that are 
underweighted decreases with age (p=0.035). Together, this implies that risk aversion 
decreases with age. Parameter η for the gender covariate suggests males overweight low 
probabilities across a wider range and underweight high probabilities across a narrower range 
than do females (p=0.052).  
For Coloured participants, φ suggests they overweight low probabilities and underweight high 
probabilities more than African participants (p=0.048). While the power function parameter r 
does not suggest differences between the two racial groups’ utility function shape (p=0.353), 
relatively less probability optimism implies Coloured participants are more risk averse relative 
to their African counterparts. Using similar reasoning, we find that Coloured participants are 
also more risk averse relative to White participants, and Indian participants are more risk averse 
than White participants. Thus, in terms of race, the RDU model is consistent with the EU model 
but risk preferences stem from different sources.  
For income, the parameter φ counterintuitively suggests underweighting high probabilities and 
overweighting low probabilities increases with income (p=0.060).45 Lastly, the value of 
parameter r on the covariate ‘Risk task first’, suggests participants that did the risk preference 
task first have less concave utility functions.  
  
 




Table 6: EU and RDU ML estimates - heterogenous preferences with treatment variable 
 EU RDU 
Power function parameter (r)   
Treatment 0.195** 0.261** 
 (0.076) (0.102) 
Age -0.005 0.027* 
 (0.010) (0.014) 
Male 0.027 -0.073 
 (0.085) (0.118) 
Coloured -0.175* 0.089 
 (0.097) (0.096) 
Indian -0.028 0.148 
 (0.102) (0.114) 
White 0.206 0.221 
 (0.134) (0.163) 
Income (ln) 0.047 0.033 
 (0.059) (0.073) 
Risk task first 0.143* 0.161* 
 (0.080) (0.096) 
Constant 0.083 -0.438 
 (0.412) (0.526) 
PWF parameter (φ)   
Treatment  -0.038 
  (0.068) 
Age  -0.013 
  (0.011) 
Male  -0.039 
  (0.078) 
Coloured  -0.148** 
  (0.075) 
Indian  -0.144 
  (0.093) 
White  0.065 
  (0.096) 
Income (ln)  -0.106* 
  (0.057) 
Risk task first  0.012 
  (0.062) 
Constant  1.836*** 
  (0.410) 
PWF parameter (η)   
Treatment  0.056 
  (0.078) 
Age  0.040** 
  (0.019) 
Male  -0.204* 
  (0.105) 
Coloured  0.357*** 





Table 6: continued 
 EU RDU 
Indian  0.188** 
  (0.086) 
White  0.088 
  (0.108) 
Income (ln)  -0.087 
  (0.057) 
Risk task first  -0.009 
  (0.071) 
Constant  0.795* 
  (0.046) 
Risk error (μ) 0.241*** 0.200*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
N 7380 7380 
Log-likelihood -4717.750 -4512.987 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
In terms of the CM programme’s overall effectiveness, treatment group participants on average 
being less risk averse than control group subjects is an important result that deserves further 
attention. A priori, we expect individuals who are more risk averse to find smoking less 
appealing than individuals who are less risk averse. As discussed earlier, smoking increases 
the probability of developing a range of debilitating and even lethal health issues by a 
substantial degree. Framing the smoker’s decision in terms of a lottery, they have the choice to 
avoid the increased likelihood of negative health outcomes like cancer with certainty but forgo 
the enjoyment to be had from smoking, or to increase their likelihood of developing smoking-
related illnesses but get the enjoyment to be had from smoking.  
Thus, we would expect the more risk averse an individual is, the less tolerant they would be of 
smoking’s impact on their chances of developing health issues. In terms of the earlier REP 
model, this means that the statistically significant treatment effect is possibly attenuated by the 




have been greater than what was estimated if there were no statistically significant differences 
in risk aversion by treatment status. 
Sample’s time preferences 
Table 7 presents the ML results for the exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic (QH) 
discounting models, assuming a linear utility function. Thus, any curvature in the shape of the 
subjects’ utility functions is ignored. A CU error specification is again assumed, and individual 
heterogeneity is ignored. 
Table 7: Discounting function ML estimates - linear utility and homogenous preferences 
 
Immediately noticeable is the magnitude of parameter δ’s values. The exponential model’s δ 
estimate of 3.371 translates to an annual discount rate of almost 340%. The error parameter ν 
is statistically significant, indicating that subjects made behavioural errors in the time 
preference task (p<0.001 for all three models). 
As there is evidence of probability weighting, Table 8 presents parameter estimates for the 
exponential, hyperbolic, and QH discounting models under the assumption of RDU. Compared 
to Table 7, these estimates of δ, employing joint estimation, are more modest and consistent 
across the models. Not accounting for probability weighting and instead jointly estimating with 
 Exponential Hyperbolic QH 
Discounting parameter (δ) 3.371*** 39.638*** 2.435*** 
 (0.351) (3.512) (0.258) 
Discounting parameter (β)   0.926*** 
   (0.006) 
Time error (ν) 40.100*** 253.061*** 39.781*** 
 (4.166) (27.218) (3.907) 
N 5220 5220 5220 
Log-likelihood -2790.649 -2890.490 -2632.237 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 




an EU model would lead to biased discounting parameter estimates because the estimates for 
the power function parameter r would capture risk aversion generated by probability weighting. 
Table 8: Discounting function ML estimates - RDU and Homogenous Preferences 
 
The exponential model’s δ parameter implies annual discount rates of about 155. The 
discounting parameter β, which captures present bias in the QH model, is statistically 
significantly less than 1 (p<0.001), providing evidence of discount rates that decline at longer 
delays.   
Table 9 presents the results from the three discounting models where the parameters can vary 
as a function of treatment assignment, demographic characteristics, and task parameters.46 First 
looking at the exponential model, we find that Coloured and Indian participants discount more 
than their African counterparts (p=0.042 and p=0.027, respectively).  
 
46 The estimates for the risk preference parameters are not displayed. 
 Exponential Hyperbolic QH 
Power function parameter (r) 0.642*** 0.688*** 0.623*** 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.040) 
PWF parameter (φ) 0.595*** 0.584*** 0.599*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
PWF parameter (η) 0.974*** 1.006*** 0.960*** 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) 
Discounting parameter (δ) 1.558*** 1.145*** 1.129*** 
 (0.198) (0.117) (0.139) 
Discounting parameter (β)   0.950*** 
   (0.005) 
Risk error (μ) 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Time error (ν) 3.288*** 4.519*** 2.867*** 
 (1.055) (1.578) (0.877) 
N 13050 13050 13050 
Log-likelihood -7737.862 -7691.891 -7567.082 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 




The results for the hyperbolic discounting model are similar. Indian participants discount more 
than African participants (p=0.03). Moreover, and counter to expectations, the hyperbolic 
model shows that when a decision involves a one-week FED, discount rates are higher than 
when there is not a FED (p=0.062).  
In the QH discounting model, looking at parameter δ, we again find that Indian participants 
discount more heavily than African participants (p=0.013). We also again find that when a 
decision involves a one-week FED, participants exhibit higher discount rates than when there 
is no FED (p<0.001). Parameter β, however, shows that a FED attenuates the effect of present 
bias (p=0.009), and that treatment group participants have a lower degree of present bias than 
control group participants (p=0.059). The latter result is interesting because it may mean that 
the statistical models’ results showing the effectiveness of the CM programme are attenuated. 
A priori, we believe that smokers who manage to abstain from smoking have less present bias 
than smokers who do not: Referring back to Gruber and Koszegi's (2001) dual-self model, 
present bias can lead one to systematically make choices that counter their long-run 
preferences. In this case, this would mean that a smoker may have decided to quit, but the 
greater their present bias, the more they would struggle to resist the temptation of a cigarette 
when faced with the decision to continue abstaining, or to smoke. In terms of this CM 
programme, treatment group participants having a lower degree of present bias may thus mean 




Table 9: Discounting function ML estimates assuming RDU - heterogenous preferences 
 Exponential Hyperbolic QH 
Discounting parameter (δ)    
Treatment -0.084 -0.029 0.043 
 (0.281) (0.158) (0.190) 
Age 0.085 0.048 0.008 
 (0.114) (0.073) (0.062) 
Male -0.235 -0.111 -0.232 
 (0.354) (0.186) (0.245) 
Coloured 0.862** 0.445 0.434 
 (0.423) (0.292) (0.272) 
Indian 1.018** 0.502** 0.806** 
 (0.461) (0.229) (0.323) 
White 0.419 0.226 0.318 
 (0.487) (0.301) (0.306) 
Income (ln) 0.200 0.080 0.170 
 (0.241) (0.144) (0.160) 
Risk task first 0.262 0.107 0.155 
 (0.331) (0.211) (0.209) 
FED 0.084 0.069* 1.003*** 
 (0.068) (0.037) (0.160) 
Constant -2.250 -0.770 -1.322 
 (2.646) (1.720) (1.413) 
Discounting parameter (β)    
Treatment   0.021* 
   (0.011) 
Age   -0.003 
   (0.007) 
Male   -0.022 
   (0.015) 
Coloured   -0.009 
   (0.019) 
Indian   0.025 
   (0.018) 
White   0.019 
   (0.017) 
Income (ln)   0.003 
   (0.011) 
Risk task first   0.009 
   (0.013) 
FED   0.428*** 
   (0.165) 
Constant   0.953*** 
   (0.150) 
Risk error (μ) 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Time error (ν) 1.383*** 1.840*** 1.415*** 
 (0.469) (0.699) (0.395) 
N 12300 12300 12300 
Log-likelihood -6978.346 -6933.805 -6702.067 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Abstinence and risk preferences 
Table 10 presents the abbreviated47 EU and RDU model ML results where, along with the 
covariates already included in Table 6, the parameters now vary as a function of the subjects’ 
abstinence status at each session. As shown earlier in the REP model, treatment assignment has 
a statistically significant effect on the subjects’ likelihood of abstinence, thus interaction terms 
between treatment and abstinence at each of the programme sessions are also included.  
I first discuss the results of the EU model and because of the interaction terms’ inclusion, I do 
so by comparing the predictive margins.48 For example, the predictive margins on the covariate 
‘treatment’ would tell us the predicted probability of a subject being abstinent when they are 
in the treatment group versus when they are in the control group, with all other covariates held 
at their mean.   
There is a statistically significant difference in the power function parameter r between 
abstinent and non-abstinent participants at programme session 3 and at the 6-month follow-up 
session (p=0.016 and p=0.016, respectively). Expectedly, at programme session 3 abstinent 
participants are more risk averse than those non-abstinent at the same session. Counter to 
expectations, however, at the 6-month follow-up session abstinent subjects are less risk averse 
than those non-abstinent at the same session. However, the proportion of abstinent subjects at 
the 6-month follow-up is (very) low so this result should be treated with caution.49 
  
 
47 Only the results of the covariates of interest are included so as to make the table easier to read. 
48 See Table 17 in Appendix D, which presents the predictive margins of the EU and RDU models. 




Table 10: EU and RDU ML estimates - heterogenous preferences with smoking abstinence 
and interaction term  
 EU RDU 
 r r φ η 
Treatment 0.195** 0.315** -0.117 0.037 
 (0.080) (0.155) (0.074) (0.101) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 1 
0.244 -0.049 -0.310** -0.704*** 
 (0.157) (0.179) (0.146) (0.157) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 2 
0.076 0.134 0.117 0.126 
 (0.225) (0.302) (0.371) (0.355) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 3 
-0.485*** -0.191 0.383*** 1.135*** 
 (0.147) (0.180) (0.134) (0.106) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 4 
-0.174 -0.195 -0.075 -0.355*** 
 (0.229) (0.287) (0.317) (0.128) 
Abstinent at 3-month 
follow-up 
-0.103 0.214 -0.364 0.202 
 (0.306) (0.315) (0.375) (0.315) 
Abstinent at 6-month 
follow-up 
0.387** 0.053 0.128 -0.380*** 
 (0.155) (0.173) (0.200) (0.136) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 1×Treatment 
0.050 -0.568 0.847*** 0.402 
 (0.325) (0.440) (0.234) (0.252) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 2×Treatment 
0.022 0.666 -0.501 -0.097 
 (0.280) (0.810) (0.454) (0.452) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 3×Treatment 
0.489** 0.356 -0.457* -1.024*** 
 (0.232) (0.337) (0.259) (0.196) 
Abstinent at programme 
session 4×Treatment 
-0.079 -0.048 0.218 0.536*** 
 (0.254) (0.332) (0.342) (0.195) 
Abstinent at 3-month 
follow-up×Treatment 
0.222 -0.453 0.592 -0.462 
 (0.368) (0.397) (0.424) (0.355) 
Abstinent at 6-month 
follow-up×Treatment 
-0.416** 0.027 -0.261 0.554** 
 (0.198) (0.283) (0.241) (0.226) 
Constant 0.457 -0.365 1.768*** 0.103 
 (0.384) (0.685) (0.440) (0.475) 
Risk error (μ) 0.234*** 0.193*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
N 7380 7380 





Table 10: continued 
Output for demographic-related variables and task order variable omitted  
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
Examining by treatment status, at programme session 3 and at the 6-month follow-up session, 
the statistically significant difference in r between abstinent and non-abstinent participants is 
only seen in the control group.50 That is, at programme session 3, abstinent control group 
participants are more risk averse than non-abstinent control group subjects (p<0.001), but 
abstinent treatment group participants are not statistically more or less risk averse than non-
abstinent treatment group participants (p=0.988).51 Similarly, at the 6-month follow-up session, 
abstinent control group participants are statistically less risk averse than non-abstinent control 
group participants, with the same result not found among their treatment group counterparts.52 
However, despite the above findings, a relationship between risk preferences and abstinence, 
and their link to treatment assignment is not clear. At programme session 4, abstinent treatment 
group participants are more risk averse than non-abstinent treatment group participants 
(p=0.032), while abstinent control group participants are not statistically more or less risk 
averse than non-abstinent control group participants. Further, at each of the other sessions and 
evaluating by treatment group assignment, there is no statistical difference in risk preferences 
between abstinent and non-abstinent participants.  
The EU model broadly supports the findings of the RDU model. That said, the RDU model 
finds risk preferences to differ not in terms of the power function parameter but rather the PWF 
 
50  See Table 17 in Appendix D, which presents the predictive margins of the EU and RDU models. The ensuing 
discussion refers this table.  
51 In this discussion, statistically significant differences in marginal effect estimates are identified using a Wald 
test. 
52 Again, the estimate for ‘Abstinent at 6-month follow-up’ should be treated with caution due to the very low 




parameters. As with the results of the ML estimates for the demographic variables, this suggests 
that any differences in risk preferences between abstinent and non-abstinent participants are 
due to differences in the way they perceive probabilities rather than, as suggested by the EU 
model, in the shape of their utility functions.  
With respect to PWF parameter φ, we do not find a statistically significant difference between 
abstinent and non-abstinent participants at any of the sessions. Analysing by treatment status, 
we find that at programme session 3, however, abstinent control group subjects weight extreme 
probabilities more heavily than their non-abstinent control group counterparts (p=0.004). This 
implies that at programme session 3, abstinent control group subjects are more risk averse than 
non-abstinent control group subjects. At programme session 2, abstinent control group subjects 
weight extreme probabilities less heavily than the non-abstinent control group subjects 
(p=0.033), but the abstinent treatment group subjects weight extreme probabilities more 
heavily than the non-abstinent treatment group subjects (p=0.004). This suggests that at this 
session, abstinent control group subjects are less risk averse than their non-abstinent 
counterparts, whereas the treatment group subjects are more risk averse than their non-abstinent 
counterparts.  
With respect to parameter η, we find that at programme session 1 abstinent subjects overweight 
low probabilities and underweight high probabilities relatively more than non-abstinent 
participants do (p<0.001). The converse holds at programme session 3 (p<0.001). In terms of 
risk preferences, these results imply that at programme session 1, because they overweight a 
wider range of low probability outcomes than they underweight high probability outcomes, 
abstinent subjects are more risk averse than their non-abstinent counterparts. Similarly, but 
conversely, at programme session 3 abstinent subjects are less risk averse than their non-
abstinent counterparts. This finding conflicts with the conclusion drawn from programme 




In summary, while at a few programme sessions there is evidence of differing risk preferences 
between abstinent and non-abstinent participants, both structural models paint a similar overall 
picture to that given earlier by the REP model: there is not strong evidence that the more risk 
averse a smoker is, the likelier it is that they will quit when enrolled in a CM programme.  
Abstinence and time preferences 
Table 11 and Table 12 present the three discounting models’ parameter estimates for the control 
group and treatment group, respectively. For the discounting parameters, the covariates 
included in the model are abstinence status at the programme sessions and the two follow-up 
sessions, the demographic covariates age, gender, race, and income, as well as a covariate for 
whether subjects did the risk preference task first. Of these covariates, only those pertaining to 
abstinence are presented in the tables.  
Within the control group, the pairwise correlation between the variables ‘Abstinent at 
programme session 2’ and ‘Abstinent at programme session 3’ is 0.856, implying high 
collinearity.53 This amount of collinearity prevents the models from converging and so to 
overcome this, I combine these variables to form ‘Abstinent at programme sessions 2 and 3.’ 
Thus, the discounting function parameters are evaluated by treatment group assignment, with 
the treatment group’s model specification identical to that of the control group except for the 
inclusion of the covariates ‘Abstinent at programme session 2’ and ‘Abstinent at programme 
session 3’ rather than ‘Abstinent at programme sessions 2 and 3.’
 
53 For comparison, the next highest correlation coefficient within the control group is between variables 




Table 11: Discounting function ML estimates assuming RDU - Heterogenous preferences 
with smoking abstinence and interaction term for the control group 
 Exponential  Hyperbolic QH 
Power function parameter (r) 0.554*** 0.593*** 0.534*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.051) 
PWF parameter (φ) 0.609*** 0.600*** 0.613*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
PWF parameter (η) 0.984*** 1.014*** 0.968*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) 
Discounting parameter (δ)    
Abstinent at programme session 1 0.983** 0.582* -0.013 
 (0.470) (0.323) (0.016) 
Abstinent at programme sessions 2 
and 3 -2.104** -1.327*** 0.066*** 
 (0.855) (0.410) (0.019) 
Abstinent at programme session 4 -0.999*** -0.682*** 0.019 
 (0.332) (0.234) (0.017) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up -2.963 -0.491 -0.111*** 
 (2.456) (0.967) (0.028) 
Abstinent at 6-month follow-up 5.100*** 1.911*** 0.024 
 (1.975) (0.585) (0.015) 
Constant 2.572 1.618 0.963*** 
 (2.167) (1.141) (0.052) 
Discounting parameter (β)    
Abstinent at programme session 1   0.754** 
   (0.351) 




   (0.691) 
Abstinent at programme session 4   -0.798*** 
   (0.259) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up   -3.076 
   (2.177) 
Abstinent at 6-month follow-up   4.547** 
   (1.787) 
Constant   1.901 
   (1.695) 
Risk error (μ) 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Time error (ν) 1.419** 1.893** 1.235*** 
 (0.578) (0.786) (0.464) 
N 6600 6600 6600 
Log-likelihood -3740.623 -3718.628 -3626.475 
Output for demographic-related variables and the task order variable omitted  
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Looking at the control group’s estimates for the exponential discounting model in Table 11, 
the results do not suggest a consistent relationship between time preferences and smoking 
abstinence. At programme session 1 and at the 6-month follow-up session, abstinent subjects 
have annual discount rates 98.3% and 510% higher than non-abstinent subjects, respectively 
(p=0.036 and p=0.01, respectively), unexpectedly suggesting that abstinent subjects discount 
their future welfare more than their non-abstinent counterparts. However, the estimate for the 
6-month follow-up session should be treated with caution as at that session only 3 out of the 
47 control group subjects are abstinent. Conversely, and according to our a priori expectations, 
at the combined programme sessions 2 and 3 and at programme session 4, abstinent subjects 
have annual discount rates 210% and 100% lower than non-abstinent participants at those 
sessions, respectively (p=0.014 and p=0.003, respectively). 
The estimates for the hyperbolic discounting model are qualitatively similar to those of the 
exponential model.54 However, in terms of magnitude, the differences in discount rates between 
abstinent and non-abstinent participants are more modest in the hyperbolic model than in the 
exponential model. Further, for the hyperbolic model’s covariate ‘Abstinent at programme 
session 1’, the estimate is statistically significant at only the 10% level.  
Like the exponential and hyperbolic model estimates, the QH model’s discounting parameter 
estimates are also inconsistent in terms of their relationship between discounting and 
abstinence, but do not match the exponential and hyperbolic model’s estimates in terms of 
direction.  With respect to parameter δ, abstinent participants have higher discount rates than 
non-abstinent participants at the combined programme sessions 2 and 3 (p<0.001), whereas at 
the 3-month follow-up session, abstinent participants have lower discount rates than non-
 
54 The δ estimates of the covariates ‘Abstinent at programme session 1’, ‘Abstinent at programme session 2 and 
3’, ‘Abstinent at programme session 4’, and ‘Abstinent at the 6-month follow-up session’ have p-values of 




abstinent participants (p<0.001). Moreover, the magnitude of the difference in the δ estimates 
between abstinent and non-abstinent subjects is substantially less than that of the exponential 
and hyperbolic discounting models, with the largest difference in the long term discount rate δ 
being 11.1%.  
Parameter β is statistically significantly greater among abstinent participants at programme 
session 1 and at the 6-month follow-up session compared to their non-abstinent participants 
(p=0.031 and p=0.011, respectively), implying that at these sessions, abstinent participants 
have a lower degree of present bias than their non-abstinent counterparts.55 However, at the 
combined programme sessions 2 and 3 and at programme session 4, parameter β is statistically 
significantly lower among abstinent participants than non-abstinent participants (p=0.033 and 
p=0.002, respectively). Together, these results do not suggest there is a consistent relationship 
between smoking abstinence and present bias among control group participants. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 11 suggest control group participants’ time preferences 
have an inconsistent relationship with smoking abstinence across the sessions, as well as 
between the QH discounting model and the other two discounting models.56  
Now looking at the results for the treatment group participants presented in Table 12, the 
exponential and hyperbolic discounting function parameter δ estimates do not suggest there to 
be a statistically significant difference in time preferences between abstinent and non-abstinent 
participants at any of the sessions. The estimates for the QH model, like those for the control 
group participants, are conflicting. At programme session 2, abstinent subjects have a higher 
discount rate than non-abstinent subjects (p=0.086), while at programme session 4 and at the 
6-month follow-up, abstinent subjects have a lower discount rate than non-abstinent subjects 
 
55 The estimate for ‘Abstinent at 6-month follow-up’ should be treated with caution. 
56 See Table 18, in Appendix D, which displays the QH function discount rates by solving for equation (7). 




(p=0.012 and p=0.081, respectively). The estimates for the parameter β do not suggest 
differences in present bias between abstinent and non-abstinent participants at any of the 
sessions.  
Table 12: Discounting function ML estimates assuming RDU - Heterogenous preferences with 
smoking abstinence and interaction term for the treatment group 
 Exponential  Hyperbolic QH 
Power function parameter (r) 0.816*** 0.788*** 0.794*** 
 (0.138) (0.080) (0.141) 
PWF parameter (φ) 0.583*** 0.590*** 0.589*** 
 (0.063) (0.054) (0.063) 
PWF parameter (η) 1.052*** 1.035*** 1.038*** 
 (0.078) (0.056) (0.080) 
Discounting parameter (δ)    
Abstinent at programme session 1 -0.724 -0.296 -0.015 
 (0.759) (0.364) (0.018) 
Abstinent at programme session 2 -0.785 -0.234 0.037* 
 (0.810) (0.334) (0.021) 
Abstinent at programme session 3 -0.335 -0.018 0.007 
 (0.644) (0.344) (0.017) 
Abstinent at programme session 4 0.603 0.245 -0.044** 
 (0.650) (0.270) (0.018) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up -0.893 -0.313 -0.003 
 (0.701) (0.264) (0.014) 
Abstinent at 6-month follow-up 2.193 0.717 -0.019* 
 (2.005) (0.466) (0.011) 
Constant -7.875 -2.652* 1.198*** 
 (5.617) (1.557) (0.093) 
Discounting parameter (β)    
Abstinent at programme session 1   -0.684 
   (0.604) 
Abstinent at programme session 2   -0.388 
   (0.553) 
Abstinent at programme session 3   -0.265 
   (0.496) 
Abstinent at programme session 4   0.201 
   (0.472) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up   -0.708 
   (0.524) 
Abstinent at 6-month follow-up   1.711 
   (1.609) 
Constant   -5.025 
   (4.080) 
Risk error (μ) 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) 
Time error (ν) 7.782 6.411 6.785 
 (7.957) (3.978) (7.121) 
N 5700 5700 5700 





Table 12: continued 
Output for demographic-related variables and the task order variable omitted  
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
The earlier REP model suggested that the more LL choices a subject made, and thus the lower 
their discount rate, the likelier it was that they would be abstinent. The discounting model 
parameters estimated by ML do not definitively support this finding. Among the control group 
participants, each of the models’ statistically significant parameter estimates vary in direction: 
some of, but not all of the estimates conform with our a priori expectation that subjects that 
discount future welfare more highly are less likely to quit smoking. Among the treatment group 
participants, the exponential and hyperbolic models do not suggest any relationship between 
time preferences and smoking abstinence. The QH model again exhibits time preference 
parameter estimates that both follow and contradict our expectations but to less of a degree 
than that of the control group’s estimates.57 
The discounting parameter results for the treatment group notably differ from those of the 
control group. For the treatment group’s exponential and hyperbolic discounting models, at 
none of the sessions is the discounting parameter δ statistically significantly different between 
abstinent and non-abstinent participants. Furthermore, for the QH model, at none of the 
sessions is the discounting parameter β statistically significantly different between abstinent 
and non-abstinent participants. These findings may be interpreted as discount rates losing their 
importance as a predictor for abstinence because the discounted reward outweighs the 
immediate gratification from smoking. Furthermore, CM possibly moderates discount rates, 
meaning that individuals with relatively high (low) discount rates find that their discount rates 
 
57 See Table 19 in Appendix D. Here, the QH model discount rates also do not suggest any relationship between 




move lower (higher) over the course of the CM programme. The way in which CM influences 
the effect time preferences have on abstinence is discussed in more detail in the Discussion and 
Conclusion section.  
Smoking intensity and risk preferences 
Table 13 presents the abbreviated EU and RDU model ML results where, along with the 
covariates already included in Table 6, the parameters now vary as a function of the non-
abstinent subjects’ smoking intensity at each session.58 As with Table 10, treatment assignment 
interaction terms are included although the RENB model did earlier suggest that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between treatment assignment and smoking intensity.  
Again, I first look at the EU model and evaluate the predictive margins. Because smoking 
intensity is a continuous variable, I evaluate the predictive margins using plots. For each 
session, these tell us the predicted values of r at 1, 5, 10, and 15 cigarettes smoked per day, 
holding all other covariates at their means. 
The results shown in Figure 10, below, are notable. The confidence intervals between 1 
cigarette per day and 15 cigarettes per day only overlap at the baseline session and at the 6-
month follow-up session. Thus, there is a general trend showing parameter r to be inversely 
related to the number of cigarettes smoked per day. This trend, however, is not at all apparent 
at the baseline session. These results suggest two effects. First, as shown by the baseline session 
graph, when smokers are not presently trying to quit, smoking intensity is not related to risk 
preferences. Second, the more risk averse a smoker is who is making a quit attempt, the more 
cigarettes they smoke when not abstinent. This finding is what was suggested by the RENB 
 
58 Each session is estimated separately in order to account for the different number of non-abstinent subjects at 




model and is counterintuitive because, as explained earlier, smoking increases the likelihood 
of developing debilitating and even lethal health issues.  








































              
Treatment 0.088 0.097 0.067 0.188 0.346*** 0.292 0.188 0.165 0.348 0.218 0.426* 0.546** 0.609*** 0.600* 
 (0.159) (0.139) (0.129) (0.133) (0.131) (0.183) (0.227) (0.199) (0.278) (0.189) (0.219) (0.222) (0.205) (0.339) 
Smoking intensity -0.006 -0.058*** -0.051** -0.037** -0.025*** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.012 -0.063*** -0.045* -0.024 -0.024** -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) 
Smoking 
intensity×Treatment 
0.012 0.035 0.023 0.006 -0.009 -0.016 0.008 0.013 0.017 0.001 -0.023 -0.028 -0.056*** -0.045 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) (0.040) (0.030) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) (0.038) 
Constant -0.011 -0.064 0.588 0.254 0.190 -0.011 0.356 -0.568 -0.168 0.255 -0.006 0.014 0.068 0.342 
 (0.395) (0.384) (0.394) (0.417) (0.391) (0.397) (0.395) (0.488) (0.580) (0.670) (0.627) (0.527) (0.700) (0.550) 
PWF parameter 
(φ) 
              
Treatment        -0.062 -0.135 0.073 -0.013 -0.032 -0.157 0.056 
        (0.148) (0.116) (0.113) (0.128) (0.121) (0.134) (0.152) 
Smoking intensity        -0.000 -0.006 0.017 0.008 -0.003 0.005 0.010 
        (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Smoking 
intensity×Treatment 
       0.001 -0.004 -0.050** -0.030 -0.012 0.014 -0.022 
        (0.013) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) 
Constant        1.838*** 1.710*** 1.873*** 1.891*** 1.797*** 1.784*** 2.037*** 
        (0.394) (0.414) (0.410) (0.380) (0.380) (0.444) (0.435) 
PWF parameter 
(η) 
              
Treatment        0.134 0.328* 0.269* 0.366** 0.284* 0.351* 0.578*** 
        (0.151) (0.184) (0.140) (0.177) (0.169) (0.180) (0.183) 
Smoking intensity        -0.002 0.014 0.040 0.049** 0.020 0.027** 0.052* 





Table 13: continued 































       -0.006 -0.051 -0.071** -0.073** -0.046** -0.050** -0.097*** 
        (0.013) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) 
Constant        0.737 1.267** 1.009* 0.960 1.074* 1.579*** 1.642*** 
        (0.464) (0.601) (0.573) (0.632) (0.637) (0.435) (0.574) 
Risk error (μ) 0.234*** 0.232*** 0.229*** 0.231*** 0.229*** 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.196*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.193*** 0.195*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
N 7110 5400 5130 4860 4950 6030 5850 7110 5400 5130 4860 4950 6030 5850 
Log-likelihood -4523.920 -3418.435 -3236.312 -3075.480 -3125.983 -3819.572 -3687.072 -4315.639 -3212.861 -3051.902 -2896.323 -2963.258 -3619.925 -3497.898 
Demographic-related variables and task order variable omitted 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 








When the margins are evaluated by treatment group assignment, we find the same as Figure 
10: that as risk aversion increases among non-abstinent smokers, smoking intensity increases.59 
The RDU model’s results generally support those of the EU model. First looking at the 
predictive margins of parameter r, Figure 11 also shows an inverse relationship between 
smoking intensity and risk aversion, although the statistical significance is not as strong as that 
seen in Figure 10.  
Figure 12 shows the predictive margins for PWF parameter φ. The figure does not suggest that 
there is a relationship between smoking intensity and the extent to which smokers underweight 
high probabilities and overweight low probabilities. Similarly, Figure 13 does not suggest that 
there is a relationship between smoking intensity and the extent to which smokers overweight 
low probabilities relatively more than they underweight high probabilities (and vice versa). 
 





Together, the results for these PWF parameters do not suggest a relationship between 
probability weighting and smoking intensity.  
The RENB model found a positive relationship between the “number of risky choices” made 
in the risk preferences elicitation task and the number of cigarettes smoked in the previous 7 
days. This implies that, on average, the more risk averse one is, the greater their smoking 
intensity. Overall, the structural models support this unexpected finding, with both the EU and 
RDU models suggesting that, on average, as risk aversion increases, smoking intensity 
increases. This result is discussed further in the Discussion and Conclusion section.  






Figure 13: RDU model predictive margins: Smoking intensity and PWF parameter η 
 
 
Smoking intensity and time preferences 
Table 14 extends the RDU estimates presented in Table 13, displaying the exponential and 
hyperbolic discounting models’ estimates for the discounting parameter δ, while omitting the 
estimates for the risk preference parameters, the covariates associated with the subjects’ 
demographics, and the covariate indicating whether the risk or time preference task was done 
first. I again analyse these estimates by evaluating the predictive margins, visualized using 





Table 14: Exponential and hyperbolic discounting function ML estimates assuming RDU - heterogenous preferences with smoking intensity and 
interaction term 































              
Treatment 0.497 0.081 -1.245 -0.244 0.113 -0.348 -2.778* -0.058 0.020 -0.712 -0.105 0.061 -0.517 -0.445 
 (0.946) (0.543) (1.648) (0.441) (0.385) (0.736) (1.476) (0.404) (0.337) (0.683) (0.272) (0.235) (0.344) (0.360) 
Smoking intensity 0.241 0.320 0.069 0.060 0.133 0.242 0.006 0.033 0.154 0.042 0.045 0.079 -0.023 0.073 
 (0.167) (0.340) (0.180) (0.148) (0.121) (0.185) (0.085) (0.028) (0.159) (0.108) (0.086) (0.065) (0.047) (0.076) 
Smoking 
intensity×Treatment -0.084 -0.156 0.315 -0.036 -0.136 -0.071 0.302 0.014 -0.079 0.150 -0.035 -0.080 0.083 0.005 
 (0.146) (0.281) (0.571) (0.152) (0.118) (0.188) (0.191) (0.047) (0.136) (0.250) (0.091) (0.066) (0.055) (0.067) 
Constant -7.508** 5.086 -4.972* -2.185 0.066 -1.907 -8.893* 0.299 2.806 -2.907 -0.683 0.430 -0.124 -0.787 
 (3.199) (4.232) (3.020) (5.445) (3.164) (2.184) (4.839) (2.589) (2.307) (1.799) (3.744) (1.689) (2.434) (1.548) 
Risk error (μ) 0.207*** 0.189*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.210*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
Time error (ν) 5.237** 3.584** 3.494 2.397** 2.323** 3.750** 4.717** 3.382** 4.695* 4.966* 3.125* 3.121** 2.811*** 5.366 
 (2.299) (1.760) (2.385) (1.050) (0.903) (1.676) (2.301) (1.340) (2.643) (2.929) (1.725) (1.280) (0.968) (3.912) 
N 11850 9000 8550 8100 8250 10050 9750 11850 9000 8550 8100 8250 10050 9750 
Log-likelihood -6678.507 -5013.490 -4698.067 -4511.649 -4612.682 -5629.603 -5405.608 -6649.733 -4976.628 -4666.475 -4482.392 -4579.294 -5623.375 -5395.629 
Demographic-related variables and task order variable omitted 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Figure 14: Exponential discounting model predictive margins: Smoking intensity and 
discounting parameter (δ) 
 
Figure 15: Hyperbolic discounting model predictive margins: Smoking intensity and 






As shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, neither discounting model suggests a relationship 
between the discounting parameter δ and smoking intensity at any of the sessions. Thus, neither 
model supports the hypothesis that smoking intensity increases the more a smoker discounts 
their future well-being.  
Similarly to Table 14, Table 15 presents the ML estimates for the QH discounting model’s 
parameters δ and β, and Figure 16 and Figure 17 present the predictive margins for the 
discounting parameters δ and β, respectively. Again, there is no evidence suggesting that 
smoking intensity is related to the degree in which a smoker discounts their future utility, and 
moreover, the estimates for parameter β do not suggest there is a relationship between smoking 
intensity and the smoker’s level of present bias.  
It does not appear that a statistically significant relationship between time preferences and 
smoking intensity depends on treatment assignment either.60 This finding is consistent with the 
results of the earlier discussed RENB statistical model. Moreover, the lack of a relationship 
between time preferences and smoking intensity among the structural models is also consistent 
with the RENB model’s results.  
 




Table 15: QH discounting function ML estimates assuming RDU - heterogenous preferences 


















       
Treatment 0.388 -0.047 -0.597 -0.150 0.089 -0.385 -0.454 
 (0.672) (0.497) (0.867) (0.330) (0.268) (0.585) (0.311) 
Smoking intensity 0.154* 0.192 0.041 0.028 0.063 0.162 0.092 
 (0.089) (0.248) (0.122) (0.115) (0.085) (0.142) (0.083) 
Smoking 
intensity×Treatment -0.046 -0.026 0.155 -0.001 -0.063 -0.011 0.001 
 (0.092) (0.235) (0.306) (0.119) (0.084) (0.150) (0.074) 
Constant -5.416*** 3.973 -2.971 -1.255 -0.033 -1.332 -0.669 
 (1.966) (2.630) (1.815) (4.047) (2.129) (1.614) (1.158) 
Discounting 
parameter (β) 
       
Treatment -0.005* -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006* -0.010** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
Smoking intensity 0.003 0.007 -0.010 0.003 0.007 0.010* 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Smoking 
intensity×Treatment -0.005* -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006* -0.010** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
Constant 1.147*** 0.832*** 1.151*** 1.038*** 0.962*** 1.071*** 1.065*** 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.059) (0.186) (0.099) (0.111) (0.081) 
Risk error (μ) 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.206*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Time error (ν) 4.379** 3.228** 2.869** 2.125** 2.079*** 3.525** 3.111* 
 (1.722) (1.411) (1.278) (0.887) (0.759) (1.504) (1.615) 
N 11850 9000 8550 8100 8250 10050 9750 
Log-likelihood -6500.526 -4874.353 -4572.991 -4392.090 -4496.670 -5498.076 -5280.976 
Demographic-related variables and task order variable omitted 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 















7. Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation was to explore the impact CM programme-enrolled smokers’ risk 
and time preferences have on their likelihood of quitting smoking, as well as on their smoking 
intensity. To this end, I adopted two approaches. The first used statistical models to estimate 
the relationship between the subjects’ abstinence status and smoking intensity levels, with their 
responses to the risk and time preference tasks. As a second approach, I used structural models 
to estimate risk and time preference parameters which were compared between abstinent and 
non-abstinent participants, as well as across different levels of smoking intensity.  
Both approaches agreed that within the confines of this CM programme, there is not an apparent 
relationship between risk preferences and abstinence. This adds to the literature’s broadly 
mixed support for the hypothesis that risk aversion and smoking activity are linked.  
On the other hand, the REP model supported the hypothesis that abstinence is likelier among 
smokers who discount their future well-being less, with the statistical model finding the number 
of LL rewards chosen in the time preference task to be a predictor of abstinence. The structural 
models also presented evidence linking abstinence to time preferences, however not necessarily 
in the way suggested by the REP model.  As mentioned earlier, by finding that time preferences 
are only correlated with abstinence among control group participants, we may infer that CM 
mitigates the impact time preferences have on the likelihood of quitting smoking.  
CM may do this by providing smokers with a choice between a sufficiently valuable monetary 
reward and smoking a cigarette. This addresses Gruber and Koszegi's (2001) earlier described 
dual self model of addiction, where individuals’ present bias leads them to weight payoffs by 
how soon they are received. At a point during the treatment period, a decision-maker must 
choose between the instant utility from smoking, and the discounted utility from the monetary 




not smoking is greater than the utility from smoking. Without the reward, the utility gained 
from being healthy relative to a smoker (and likely only experienced decades in the future 
among a sample of students), is discounted to the point where it is less than the utility gained 
from smoking.  
Furthermore, CM possibly moderates individual’s discount rates from relative extremes. This 
interpretation is loosely supported by Landes, Christensen and Blokel (2012), who found that 
within a CM programme targeting opiate addiction, participants’ measured discount rates on 
average decreased between treatment onset and the end of the 12-week programme. However, 
they did not find there to be a correlation between time preferences and abstinence, so a 
proposed aetiology where the CM programme lowers discount rates, and thereby causes 
abstinence, is not supported by their findings.  
That said, the structural models I presented for treatment group participants do not suggest a 
relationship between lower discount rates and higher rates of abstinence either. Landes, 
Christensen and Blokel (2012) did not have a control group, thus preventing analysis that would 
show that the discount rates for control-group recovering addicts are a predictor of abstinence, 
while among treatment smokers it is not. As all their participants received treatment, their 
finding that discount rates are not a predictor of abstinence is consistent with my findings.  
However, the discussion above does not adequately explain why at certain sessions, higher 
discount rates meant an increased likelihood of abstinence. One possibility is that CM moves 
discount rates from either discounting extreme: low discounting and high discounting. A 
follow-up study that tracks the change in participant’s discount rates over the course of the 




With respect to smoking intensity, both the statistical and structural models show, counter to 
our a priori expectations and prior evidence,61 that smoking intensity has a positive relationship 
with risk aversion. The more cigarettes one smokes, the likelier one is to develop potentially 
deadly diseases. Thus, the more risk averse a smoker is, the fewer cigarettes we would expect 
them to smoke. However, the data show the opposite. 
A potential explanation for this result is the subjects’ level of stress. With risk aversion 
increasing with stress levels (Cahlíková and Cingl, 2017), and smoking intensity also 
increasing with stress levels (Mckee et al., 2011), it is possible the smokers’ stress levels rather 
than their risk preference determine their smoking intensity. However, this explanation does 
not neatly explain why at the baseline session, when subjects are not making a quit attempt, 
risk preferences are not a predictor for smoking intensity. Further research exploring this 
relationship would improve our understanding of why this is the case.  
In contrast to the findings of Harrison et al. (2018), neither the statistical nor structural models 
suggest a relationship between smoking intensity and time preferences. The difference between 
our findings is possibly because their study’s sample was not limited to smokers wanting to 
quit and enrolled in a CM programme. 
Focusing on the implication of these results on the CM programme’s outcomes, I found that 
risk and time preferences are not balanced equally between the control and treatment groups. 
Because treatment group participants on average have less present bias than the control group 
participants, the CM programme is possibly less effective at promoting abstinence than what 
HKR (2020) reported. On the other hand, because treatment group participants are less risk 
averse than their control group counterparts, the CM programme’s reported influence on 
smoking intensity may have been understated. Nevertheless, when the statistical models 
 
61 For example, Harrison et al. (2018) did not find any statistically significant relationship between risk 




include the variables associated with the number of risky choices and number of LL choices 
made in the decision-making tasks, the magnitude of the treatment effect on abstinence actually 
increases, while the treatment effect on smoking intensity remains statistically insignificant.   
This dissertation contributes to the limited existing literature examining the impact risk and 
time preferences have on smoking behaviour within the context of a CM programme. First, 
unlike any of the existing literature, it explores the relationship between risk preferences and 
smoking behaviour among CM programme enrolled smokers. Second, this dissertation adds to 
the consensus that individuals’ time preferences are a predictor of their likelihood of 
abstinence. This said, the relationship does not directly support other papers’ research which 
suggests that lower discount rates are correlated with higher rates of abstinence. Third, in terms 
of methodology, I jointly estimated the time preference parameters with the risk preference 
parameters, yielding discount rates that are more accurate than when estimated assuming a 
linear utility function. Finally, the study’s design has the advantages of a relatively large sample 
size, a relatively long study period, the use of real rather than hypothetical rewards, and the use 
of FEDs in the time preference elicitation task.  
Naturally, this study has limitations. First, looking at those particular to the CM programme, 
despite the sample size being relatively large, having more participants would have increased 
the power of the models’ findings. Second, a CO test only detects if someone has smoked 
within the previous 2 days, thereby allowing participants to ‘game’ the programme as each 
testing session is seven days apart. Finally, due to the nature of the intervention, neither the 
treatment subjects nor RAs were blind to treatment allocation, thus allowing the possibility of 
performance bias.  
In the risk and time preference tasks, we are assuming there is a correlation between 




in terms of their health. It may very possibly be that for a significant portion of the sample, this 
correlation is weak. Overcoming this potential issue is difficult, but an alternative approach 
could be to use rewards more closely tied to health. As an example, instead of cash rewards, 
vouchers of varying amounts that can only be spent at places like gyms or health shops could 
be used. 
In terms of limitations of the statistical methodology, the structural models did not converge 
when covariates were highly correlated. Thus, when examining the relationship between 
abstinence and time preferences, I had to estimate the discounting models’ parameters by 
treatment assignment, with the control group’s session 2 abstinence and session 3 abstinence 
indicators combined. Given the inconsistency of the those discounting models’ results, it would 
have been useful seeing separate estimates for ‘abstinent at session 2’ and ‘abstinent at session 
3’. Lastly, mixture models allow for the possibility that the exponential model explains certain 
choices better than the hyperbolic model, but the hyperbolic model explains other choices 
better. Future research incorporating mixture models, as well as a greater variety of discounting 
models (e.g., a Weibull discounting function), would give us a better understanding of how risk 
and time preferences affect smoking behaviour in the context of a CM programme. 
Despite the above issues, the analysis presented in this dissertation offers important new 
insights for treating tobacco addiction. Notably, in this CM programme, time preferences, not 
risk preferences, impact the likelihood of abstinence, but risk preferences, not time preferences, 
affect smoking intensity. While the directional impact time preferences have on abstinence is 
unclear, the results do suggest that CM’s success at treating addiction is at least partly due to it 
weakening the influence time preferences have on the individual’s choice to break abstinence. 
In terms of smoking intensity, the results do not suggest time preferences to affect smoking 
intensity, but do find, unexpectedly and potentially due to an omitted variable, e.g., stress, that 
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Figure 18 shows the set of Marschak-Machina (MM) triangles representing the lottery pairs in 
the risk preference task. Each triangles’ heading provides the gradient of the lines connecting 
the lottery pairs. The vertical and horizontal axes show the probability assigned to receiving 
the lottery’s highest and lowest prizes, respectively. Each dot represents a lottery while the 
lines connecting dots shows a lottery pair used in the risk preference task. These lines are 
indifference curves, where participants are expected to be indifferent between the lottery pairs 
shown in each triangle. The probability of the intermediate prize is calculated as the sum of the 
high and low prizes’ probabilities subtracted from 1. Only the lotteries that had no more than 




Figure 18: MM triangles of the risk preference task lotteries 
 
Moving north-easterly along the lines means that less probability is assigned to the intermediate 
reward and more weight to the lowest and highest rewards. This means that the riskiest lotteries 
are those lying on the hypotenuse while the least risky are situated at the triangle’s origin.  
Figure 18 shows that the risk preference task provided good coverage of the probability space 
and covered a full range of risk preferences. Risk seeking behaviour is covered by the lottery 
pairs with a slope less than 1, risk neutral behaviour by the lottery pairs with a slope of 1, and 







This section provides a description of the Prelec (1998) PWF and serves as a reference when 
describing the results for the RDU estimates in Table 10 and Table 13. PWFs are an essential 
component of RDU as they provide the nonlinearity of its probability weighting. As described 
in the Statistical Methodology section, the Prelec (1998) PWF takes the functional form:  
π(p)=exp[-η(-ln p)φ]                                                  (26) 
which is defined for 1 > p > 0, and φ > 0. Figure 19 below provides a series of PWFs taking on 
a range of values for parameters φ and η:  
Figure 19: Representative graphs of the Prelec PWF 
 
They y-axis represents the individual’s subjective probability weights associated with the 
objective probabilities displayed on the x-axis. The second row of figures shows that where 




π(p)=pη                                    (27) 
which is a power function. Thus, the graph at the centre represents no probability weighting. 
The first row, where φ=0.5, shows graphs resembling an inverse-S shape where a representative 
individual overweights low-probability events and underweights high-probability events. The 
converse holds, i.e., an S-shaped curve, for the third row where φ=2.  
Where parameter η<1, the curve’s inflection point lies above the 45º line, whereas when η>1, 
the point of inflection lies below the 45º line. A point of inflection above the 45º line means 
the individual overweights low probabilities relatively more than they underweight high 
probabilities. The converse holds for points of inflection below the 45º line. When η=1, the 







To assess the methodology’s robustness, a pooled probit regression and a pooled negative 
binomial regression are run. The coefficients estimates are shown in Table 16.  
The results of the pooled probit regression and the pooled negative binomial regression are 
broadly in line with what was reported for Regression 1c and Regression 2c respectively.  
The statistically significant intraclass correlation coefficient in Regression 1c (𝜌 = 0.470) 
suggests a REP model is preferable to a pooled probit regression.62 Formally, this coefficient 
is the ratio of the between-cluster (individual subject) variance to the total variance. As the 
intraclass correlation is statistically significant, it is important that the serial dependence of the 
error term is incorporated in the models’ statistical specification. Similarly, a RENB model is 
preferable to a pooled negative binomial regression, as shown by the results of the likelihood 
ratio test (p<0.001).  
 




Table 16: Pooled Probit and Pooled Negative Binomial Regressions 
 
Pooled Probit Pooled Negative Binomial 
Treatment 1.021*** 0.243* 
 
(0.241) (0.129) 
Age 0.262 -0.048 
 
(0.200) (0.114) 
Age squared -0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Male 0.176 0.067 
 
(0.316) (0.128) 
Coloured 0.453 0.072 
 
(0.347) (0.132) 
Indian 0.283 0.162 
 
(0.380) (0.160) 
White 0.799*** 0.270* 
 
(0.294) (0.149) 
Income (ln) -0.131 0.071 
 
(0.226) (0.083) 
Number of risky choices -0.032 -0.041* 
 
(0.031) (0.023) 
Number of risky choices squared 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of LL choices -0.045** -0.011 
 
(0.019) (0.012) 
Number of LL choices squared 0.001*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Risk task completed first 0.142 -0.004 
 (0.225) (0.125) 
Programme sessions  -0.970*** 
 
 (0.085) 
3-month follow-up session  -0.495*** 
 
 (0.083) 
6-month follow-up session  -0.488*** 
 
 (0.077) 
Constant -4.596 2.992* 
 (2.936) (1.753) 
N 553 425 







Table 17: Marginal effects of EU and RDU models, abstinence 
 
EU RDU 
 r r φ η 
Treatment assignment     
Control 0.380*** 0.499*** 0.671*** 1.063***  
(0.050) (0.049) (0.054) (0.061) 
Treatment 0.653*** 0.871*** 0.580*** 1.080***  
(0.063) (0.154) (0.052) (0.083) 
Abstinence at programme 
session 1 
    
Non-abstinent at programme 
session 1 0.485*** 0.779*** 0.579*** 1.135***  
(0.039) (0.134) (0.046) (0.075) 
Abstinent at programme session 1 0.753*** 0.467*** 0.662*** 0.618***  
(0.151) (0.105) (0.093) (0.073) 
Control × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 1 0.336*** 0.508*** 0.727*** 1.191***  
(0.064) (0.063) (0.068) (0.084) 
Control × Abstinent at 
programme session 1 0.580*** 0.459*** 0.417*** 0.487***  
(0.124) (0.147) (0.113) (0.094) 
Treatment × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 1 0.599*** 0.983*** 0.481*** 1.136***  
(0.052) (0.221) (0.070) (0.109) 
Treatment × Abstinent at 
programme session 1 0.894*** 0.367* 1.018*** 0.834***  
(0.289) (0.188) (0.149) (0.132) 
Abstinence at programme 
session 2 
    
Non-abstinent at programme 
session 2 0.520*** 0.589*** 0.673*** 1.047***  
(0.054) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) 
Abstinent at programme session 2 0.606*** 1.031*** 0.558*** 1.128***  
(0.133) (0.344) (0.213) (0.241) 
Control × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 2 0.367*** 0.476*** 0.651*** 1.041***  
(0.063) (0.086) (0.078) (0.051) 
Control × Abstinent at 
programme session 2 0.444** 0.610*** 0.768** 1.167***  
(0.193) (0.232) (0.319) (0.337) 
Treatment × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 2 0.636*** 0.734*** 0.645*** 1.075***  
(0.084) (0.074) (0.054) (0.066) 
Treatment × Abstinent at 
programme session 2 0.735*** 1.534** 0.261 1.105***  
(0.150) (0.741) (0.236) (0.302) 
Abstinence at programme 
session 3 




Table 17: continued 
 EU RDU 
 r r φ η 
Non-abstinent at programme 
session 3 0.559*** 0.682*** 0.620*** 0.981***  
(0.046) (0.126) (0.056) (0.070) 
Abstinent at programme session 3 0.301*** 0.656*** 0.791*** 1.642***  
(0.088) (0.126) (0.085) (0.089) 
Control × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 3 0.487*** 0.541*** 0.586*** 0.813***  
(0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) 
Control × Abstinent at 
programme session 3 0.002 0.350** 0.970*** 1.949***  
(0.125) (0.154) (0.126) (0.118) 
Treatment × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 3 0.652*** 0.834*** 0.596*** 1.056***  
(0.075) (0.194) (0.081) (0.101) 
Treatment × Abstinent at 
programme session 3 0.657*** 1.000*** 0.522*** 1.167***  
(0.143) (0.225) (0.153) (0.135) 
Abstinence at programme 
session 4 
    
Non-abstinent at programme 
session 4 0.592*** 0.756*** 0.601*** 1.033***  
(0.048) (0.098) (0.037) (0.062) 
Abstinent at programme session 4 0.381*** 0.538*** 0.627*** 0.927***  
(0.122) (0.174) (0.170) (0.078) 
Control × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 4 0.421*** 0.544*** 0.688*** 1.145***  
(0.047) (0.054) (0.064) (0.074) 
Control × Abstinent at 
programme session 4 0.247 0.349 0.613** 0.790***  
(0.209) (0.253) (0.276) (0.103) 
Treatment × Non-abstinent at 
programme session 4 0.712*** 0.927*** 0.546*** 1.038***  
(0.075) (0.167) (0.055) (0.092) 
Treatment × Abstinent at 
programme session 4 0.459*** 0.684*** 0.690*** 1.219***  
(0.096) (0.187) (0.127) (0.120) 
Abstinence at 3-month follow-
up 
    
Non-abstinent at 3-month follow-
up 0.533*** 0.707*** 0.622*** 1.063***  
(0.039) (0.094) (0.035) (0.057) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up 0.533*** 0.711*** 0.533*** 1.051***  
(0.159) (0.210) (0.206) (0.189) 
Control × Non-abstinent at 3-
month follow-up 0.385*** 0.489*** 0.688*** 1.053***  





Table 17: continued 
 EU RDU 
 r r φ η 
Control × Abstinent at 3-month 
follow-up 0.283 0.702** 0.325 1.255***  
(0.273) (0.306) (0.324) (0.276) 
Treatment × Non-abstinent at 3-
month follow-up 0.647*** 0.882*** 0.569*** 1.093***  
(0.067) (0.160) (0.054) (0.085) 
Treatment × Abstinent at 3-month 
follow-up 0.766*** 0.644*** 0.797*** 0.834***  
(0.116) (0.207) (0.182) (0.184) 
Abstinence at 6-month follow-
up 
    
Non-abstinent at 6-month follow-
up 0.523*** 0.695*** 0.628*** 1.061***  
(0.037) (0.092) (0.035) (0.058) 
Abstinent at 6-month follow-up 0.717*** 0.761*** 0.635*** 0.938***  
(0.084) (0.138) (0.112) (0.088) 
Control × Non-abstinent at 6-
month follow-up 0.347*** 0.494*** 0.660*** 1.095***  
(0.052) (0.057) (0.055) (0.068) 
Control × Abstinent at 6-month 
follow-up 0.735*** 0.547*** 0.788*** 0.715***  
(0.149) (0.146) (0.198) (0.105) 
Treatment × Non-abstinent at 6-
month follow-up 0.655*** 0.864*** 0.591*** 1.066***  
(0.063) (0.155) (0.055) (0.083) 
Treatment × Abstinent at 3-month 
follow-up 0.627*** 0.944*** 0.459*** 1.239***  
(0.106) (0.259) (0.113) (0.182) 
N 7380 7380 7380 7380 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
 
 
Table 18: QH discount rate estimates, control group 
 dQH(1) 
Abstinent at programme session 1 -0.0112 
 (0.016) 
Abstinent at programme sessions 2 and 3 -1.725*** 
 (0.342) 
Abstinent at programme session 4 -2.278*** 
 (0.411) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up -1.289*** 
 (0.207) 





Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 19: QH discount rate estimates, treatment group 
 dQH(1) 
Abstinent at programme session 1 -2.440* 
 (1.265) 
Abstinent at programme sessions 2  -3.673 
 (3.777) 
Abstinent at programme session 3 -4.805 
 (7.097) 
Abstinent at programme session 4 3.760 
 (11.224) 
Abstinent at 3-month follow-up -2.408** 
 (0.207) 
Abstinent at 6-month follow-up -0.427 
 (0. 541) 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Figure 20: EU model predictive margins: Smoking intensity and power function parameter 
(r) for the control group 
 
 
Figure 21: EU model predictive margins: Smoking intensity and power function parameter 





Figure 22: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and exponential discounting model’s 
parameter (δ) for the control group 
 
 
Figure 23: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and hyperbolic discounting model’s 





Figure 24: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and QH discounting model’s parameter (δ) 
for the control group 
 
 
Figure 25: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and QH discounting model’s parameter (β) 





Figure 26: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and exponential discounting model’s 
parameter (δ) for the treatment group 
 
 
Figure 27: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and hyperbolic discounting model’s 





Figure 28: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and QH discounting model’s parameter (δ) 
for the treatment group 
 
 
Figure 29: Predictive margins: Smoking intensity and QH discounting model’s parameter (β) 
for the treatment group 
 
 
